United States v. Kielan Franklin, 18 F.4th 1105

Franklin financed a heroin purchase; victims returned with less/bad product, prompting Franklin to demand double his money and to plan a recovery.
Franklin, Cowser, Hiler, and Pitsch executed a home-entry robbery; Hiler and Pitsch were armed; minor property and about a gram of heroin were taken.
Franklin initially resisted admitting the planned robbery at a first change-of-plea hearing, claiming he intended only to recover money and did not know others were armed; the plea was rejected and he pleaded not guilty.
After co-defendants pled, Hiler and Pitsch told an FBI agent that Franklin had sent a note asking for favorable testimony and had threatened or warned them; Hiler reported being assaulted after disclosing the note; Pitsch sought a transfer after being warned he would be "on paper."
Franklin later pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence; at sentencing the district court applied a two-level obstruction enhancement based on hearsay statements relayed through the FBI agent.
Franklin appealed, arguing (1) Hobbs Act robbery is not a categorical "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A), and (2) the district court violated due process by relying on unreliable hearsay at sentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A)	Franklin: Hobbs Act robbery does not categorically qualify under the elements clause	Government: Binding Ninth Circuit precedent treats §1951 robbery as a crime of violence	Court: Affirmed; Mendez and Dominguez bind the panel—Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause
Whether district court violated due process by relying on coconspirator hearsay at sentencing (obstruction enhancement)	Franklin: Sentencing relied on unsworn, secondhand statements lacking minimal indicia of reliability, denying ability to confront accusers	Government: Agent testified; government introduced corroborating, nonhearsay evidence (note copy, agent’s observation of injuries, plea-hearing transcript); co-defendants’ statements corroborate each other	Court: No due-process violation. Clarified review: determinations of procedural reliability are legal (de novo); substantive reliability is factual (clear error). Here corroboration and opportunity to challenge satisfied due process
Whether appeal waiver barred review of sentencing challenge	Franklin: Appellate waiver should not preclude review of due-process claim	Government: (did not press waiver on appeal)	Court: Government forfeited waiver argument; court addressed the merits

United States v. Mendez, 992 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1993) (held Hobbs Act robbery involves force and is a crime of violence)
United States v. Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020) (reaffirmed Mendez and held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidated the residual clause relied on in some §924(c) analyses)
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (due process forbids sentencing based on materially false or untested information)
United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971) (sentencing cannot rest on unverified informer reports that shift burden to defendant)
United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1993) (hearsay at sentencing may be admissible if corroborated; minimal indicia of reliability satisfied by corroboration)
United States v. Huckins, 53 F.3d 276 (9th Cir. 1995) (a coconspirator’s unsworn statements are presumptively unreliable absent corroboration)
United States v. Berry, 258 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (consistent coconspirator statements may supply minimal indicia of reliability)
United States v. Chee, 110 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1997) (intrinsically reliable victim statements made contemporaneously and corroborated may be used at sentencing)
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (distinguishes legal questions from factual ones for standards of appellate review)