United States v. Kevin Lebeau
949 F.3d 334
| 7th Cir. | 2020Background
- In 2004 LeBeau and Bodie obtained a $1.925M mortgage from Amcore to redevelop LeBeau’s failing health club; both personally guaranteed the loan.
- LeBeau submitted false/incomplete personal financial statements and the project defaulted; Amcore initiated foreclosure and the parties negotiated forbearance agreements in 2006–2007.
- Bodie and LeBeau made false representations to Amcore (e.g., about rezoning, investor commitments) and raised funds from investors (Palmquists) without disclosing defaults or unauthorized property interests.
- Amcore ultimately foreclosed and recovered $375,000; individual investors lost principal. A grand jury indicted LeBeau and Bodie; a 2017 jury convicted both of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344(1)) and false statements (18 U.S.C. § 1014).
- Each was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment and ordered to pay $1,016,000 restitution. Both appealed raising discrete challenges to instructions, evidence, restitution counsel, timeliness of the superseding indictment, and sufficiency of the evidence.
Issues
| Issue | LeBeau's Argument | Government/Bodie (opposing) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jury instruction: materiality for §1344(1) | Omission of a materiality instruction relieved gov’t burden and prejudiced him | Materiality not required for §1344(1) per some precedent; here counsel consented to the instruction | Waiver by affirmative consent; even if forfeited, any error harmless; no reversal |
| Admission of victims’ losses and prior-victim testimony | Testimony about Amcore/investor losses and prior-victim status was prejudicial victim-impact evidence inadmissible under Rule 403 | Evidence relevant to scope, method of scheme, and defendants’ mens rea; admissible | Plain-error review; not so egregiously prejudicial as to require reversal |
| Ineffective assistance re: restitution | Sentencing counsel failed to challenge restitution to Amcore (should have argued bank recklessness per Litos) | Litos distinguishable; challenge unlikely to succeed; counsel’s performance not deficient or prejudicial | No Sixth Amendment violation; restitution affirmed |
| Timeliness of superseding indictment (Bodie) | Superseding indictment materially broadened charges so it cannot relate back to 2014 indictment and is time‑barred | Superseding indictment (filed 2016) charged conduct within the 10‑year statute; relation‑back irrelevant | Plain‑error review; superseding indictment timely; claim fails |
| Sufficiency of the evidence (Bodie) | Evidence was insufficient to convict him of bank fraud and false‑statement counts | Letters, fraudulent documents, Palmquist transaction, and role in forbearance negotiations supported jury findings | Evidence sufficient; convictions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Neder, 527 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (materiality is an element of federal fraud statutes)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (Sup. Ct.) (distinction between waiver and forfeiture; consequences of waiver)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Sup. Ct.) (standards for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- United States v. Litos, 847 F.3d 906 (7th Cir.) (restitution to bank may be barred where bank acted recklessly)
- United States v. Ajayi, 808 F.3d 1113 (7th Cir.) (discussion of elements required for §1344(1) prosecutions)
- United States v. Natale, 719 F.3d 719 (7th Cir.) (waiver by affirmative approval of jury instruction)
- United States v. Reynolds, 189 F.3d 521 (7th Cir.) (application of Neder to bank‑fraud instructions)
- United States v. Pribble, 127 F.3d 583 (7th Cir.) (instruction omissions viewed in context; materiality concept may be encompassed)