United States v. Kevin Dalasta, 3 F.4th 1121

In 2015 Dalasta threatened suicide with a gun during a family confrontation; police found he possessed firearms illegally and he was charged in federal court with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm.
The Iowa district court found him incompetent to stand trial, ordered competency and dangerousness evaluations at USMCFP, and concluded he was unlikely to be restored to competency; the government then sought civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246.
USMCFP panel (Drs. Christiansen and Sarrazin) concluded Dalasta posed a danger if released, citing delusional/confabulatory beliefs, intent to possess/use firearms, poor insight, emotional reactivity, and limited reality testing.
Dr. Richart DeMier (defense expert) concluded there was insufficient evidence of dangerousness but conditioned that opinion on assumed supervised living with no firearm access; he acknowledged access to weapons would change his view.
The magistrate and district court found the panel’s opinion more persuasive (noting panel’s greater contact, consistency of findings, and DeMier’s reliance on assumptions), and ordered commitment under § 4246; Dalasta appealed challenging only the dangerousness finding.

Issue	Dalasta's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred in discounting Dr. DeMier as conveying uncertainty/changed views	Court improperly discounted DeMier for expressing uncertainty and changed findings	Court may weigh experts and reject opinions whose reasoning supports different results	No clear error: court permissibly found DeMier less persuasive and supported its credibility findings
Whether the court shifted burden by requiring certainty about future dangerousness	Court demanded clairvoyance from DeMier, shifting burden to Dalasta	Court merely pointed out DeMier’s opinion relied on assumptions about nonmedical conditions (living with parents, no guns)	No burden shift: court reasonably treated those assumptions as weakening DeMier’s opinion
Whether the court improperly favored government experts because they spent more time with Dalasta	Time disparity alone cannot justify discounting DeMier	Court may consider time/contact as one factor and weigh expert testimony accordingly	No error: time disparity not dispositive; court relied mainly on weaknesses in DeMier’s opinion and consistency of panel findings

United States v. Thomas, 949 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2020) (reviews § 4246 dangerousness findings for clear error and allows factfinder to weigh expert credibility)
S.A. v. United States, 129 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 1997) (clear-and-convincing standard for § 4246 and delusions/threats can show dangerousness)
United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2002) (substantial risk may be shown by conduct evincing genuine possibility of future harm)
United States v. Ecker, 30 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1994) (delusions and threats can support dangerousness findings under § 4246)
United States v. Evanoff, 10 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1993) (improved recent behavior does not by itself defeat a finding of dangerousness)
United States v. Bilyk, 949 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1991) (factfinder may reject expert conclusions when reasoning supports different results)
Skar v. City of Lincoln, 599 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1979) (factfinder has authority to assign weight to expert testimony based on circumstances)