United States v. Kernell
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1690
6th Cir.2012Background
- Kernell was convicted of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 for deleting information on his computer related to gaining access to Sarah Palin's Palin email account.
- Kernell used publicly available information to answer Yahoo's password-reset questions, changed the Palin password to 'popcorn,' and logged into the account.
- He posted on 4chan taking credit for the hack and shared screenshots and at least one photo of Palin family members from the account attachments.
- Kernell engaged in further online activity, including a subsequent 'Hello' thread detailing the hack and deleting evidence to avoid investigation.
- The FBI began investigating; Kernell later was interviewed, and the government seized his computer during a search warrant, uncovering relevant material.
- The indictment charged four counts; Kernell was convicted on Count Four (obstruction) and acquitted/lesser-included on other counts; he appeals the Count Four conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge § 1519 as vague | Kernell | Kernell | Kernell has standing to challenge § 1519 as applied to him |
| Constitutionality of § 1519 and mens rea scope | Kernell argues lack of specific intent and ambiguous structure | Government argues § 1519 requires intent to obstruct and yields no nexus requirement | § 1519 properly construed with intent to obstruct; no nexus requirement imported from other statutes |
| Sufficiency of evidence for obstruction under § 1519 | Kernell contends insufficient evidence of obstructive intent | Government contends clear intent to hinder investigation is shown by posts and deletions | Evidence supports a reasonable jury's finding of obstructive intent and contemplation of an investigation |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Krumrei, 258 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2001) (vagueness review for § 1519; standard de novo)
- Hill v. State, 167 F.3d 1055 (6th Cir. 1999) (standing to challenge statute based on application)
- United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2011) (three-scenario reading of § 1519; supports intentional obstruction)
- United States v. Lanham, 617 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2010) (contemplation of investigation broad interpretation favorable to § 1519)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (addressed corruption/inherent malign and related concepts in obstruction context)
- United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d 556 (D. Md. 2011) (district court interpreting § 1519 aligned with obstructive intent requirement)
- United States v. Wortman, 488 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2007) (application of § 1519 to non-traditional records and duties)