965 F.3d 647
8th Cir.2020Background
- Eagle Chasing was federally convicted of second-degree murder in 2002 (federal prosecution asserted because the crime occurred in Indian country) and received 168 months imprisonment plus supervised release.
- He incurred three supervised-release revocations: first (served 10 months) for noncompliance, drinking, and DUI; second for absconding (20 months); third for absconding and violating tribal law, yielding a 30-month sentence that he appeals.
- At issue on appeal: (1) whether the district court had jurisdiction given his challenge to the original §1153 (Indian country) basis; (2) whether revocation sentencing under 18 U.S.C. §3583(e)(3) requires a jury; (3) whether the presiding judge should have recused for bias; (4) sufficiency of evidence for absconding and eluding charges; and (5) procedural and substantive reasonableness of the 30‑month revocation sentence.
- Key factual disputes: Eagle Chasing left his residential re-entry center (Glory House) by breaking a window and traveled ~300 miles before notifying his probation officer; a tribal officer in an unmarked car with lights/siren attempted to stop him after a traffic infraction and Eagle Chasing initially failed to stop.
- The district court relied on statutory authority for revocation under 18 U.S.C. §3583, prior admissions by Eagle Chasing to facts in earlier hearings, and its routine practice of imposing increased sentences on repeat revocations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction to revoke supervised release | Eagle Chasing: underlying §1153 basis invalid → district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke | Government: revocation jurisdiction rests on §3583, independent of original prosecution basis | Court: rejected collateral attack; court properly had jurisdiction under §3583 |
| Right to jury trial for revocation sentence | Eagle Chasing: revocation sentencing under §3583(e)(3) violates Sixth Amendment | Government: revocation is not a criminal prosecution requiring jury; existing precedent controls | Court: followed precedent (Morrissey line); Haymond does not mandate reversal here; no jury right |
| Judicial recusal | Eagle Chasing: judge’s prior remarks show bias/prejudgment | Government: remarks arose from prior proceedings and did not show deep-seated antagonism; judge presumption of impartiality | Court: abuse-of-discretion review; remarks insufficient for recusal under Liteky |
| Sufficiency of evidence for violations (absconding; eluding police) | Eagle Chasing: he notified probation officer; left Glory House because he was stabbed; tribal officer’s vehicle was unmarked → cannot prove eluding | Government: failure to notify for 72 hours, travel 300 miles, and conduct supports absconding; lights/siren can constitute adequate marking/notice | Court: district court did not clearly err on absconding; eluding may be close but any error harmless given other violations |
| Procedural/substantive reasonableness of 30‑month sentence | Eagle Chasing: district court relied on contested PSR facts and over-weighted his prior murder | Government: defendant previously admitted facts; court permissibly considered murder and revocation history | Court: no significant procedural error; sentence substantively reasonable and within district court discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived)
- United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 2009) (limits on collateral attack in revocation proceedings)
- United States v. Mosby, 719 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2013) (district court’s revocation jurisdiction derives from §3583)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation is not part of a criminal prosecution; full criminal jury rights do not apply)
- United States v. Coleman, 404 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting jury-trial challenge to supervised-release revocation)
- United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019) (plurality/concurring/dissenting views on jury issues in §3583(k) revocations)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (standard for recusal based on judicial remarks)
- United States v. Menteer, 408 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 2005) (prior admissions may obviate PSR objection)