United States v. Kenneth Door
917 F.3d 1146
| 9th Cir. | 2019Background
- In 2011 police searched Kenneth Randale Door’s home and found firearms, body armor, explosives, and drug paraphernalia; Door was indicted and in 2014 convicted of multiple felony counts.
- Door’s original 300-month sentence was vacated and remanded; at resentencing (2017) the probation officer treated two prior Washington felonies as "crimes of violence," producing a Guidelines base offense level of 24.
- The two prior convictions at issue were: (1) 1997 felony harassment for threatening to kill (Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) & (2)(b)); (2) 2002 second-degree assault (Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021(1)(c)).
- Door argued neither conviction qualified as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which would reduce his base level and Guidelines range.
- The district court treated both convictions as crimes of violence and imposed a 276-month sentence; on appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed that felony harassment is a crime of violence but held second-degree assault is not.
- Because only one prior conviction qualifies, the court vacated Door’s sentence and remanded for resentencing with the corrected base offense level.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 1997 Washington felony harassment (threat to kill) is a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines force clause | Gov: It involves a threat to use violent physical force, so it fits the force clause | Door: Werle is distinguishable; Washington aiding-and-abetting breadth might render the statute overbroad | Felony harassment (threat to kill) qualifies under the force clause; Werle controls, aiding-and-abetting concern is irrelevant to force-clause analysis |
| Whether 2002 Washington second-degree assault is a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2 (including residual clause) | Gov: District court treated it as a crime of violence (residual or force) | Door: Statute is overbroad; can criminalize non-violent, offensive touching or assaults tied to nonviolent-felony intent | Second-degree assault does not qualify: it fails the force clause and the residual-clause two-part test and is indivisible, so it is not a crime of violence |
| Whether Valdivia-Flores reasoning (aiding-and-abetting breadth) invalidates Washington convictions as predicate offenses | Door: Because Washington aiding-and-abetting is broader than federal law, many WA statutes may be overbroad | Gov: Valdivia-Flores applied to enumerated/generic-offense comparisons; force-clause analysis differs | Court rejects Door’s broad reading; Valdivia-Flores does not undermine Werle or the force-clause holding for felony harassment |
| Relief required if one predicate is invalid | Door: If one prior is not a crime of violence, his base level should be lower and resentencing required | Gov: (implicit) maintain sentence if both predicates stand | Because only one prior conviction qualifies, the Guidelines base offense level was miscalculated; sentence vacated and case remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Werle v. United States, 877 F.3d 879 (9th Cir.) (threat-to-kill felony harassment qualifies under Guidelines force clause)
- Robinson v. Holder, 869 F.3d 933 (9th Cir.) (Washington second-degree assault not a crime of violence under force clause)
- Vederoff v. United States, 914 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir.) (discussing categorical/ enumerated-offense analyses applicable to Washington statutes)
- Adkins v. United States, 883 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir.) (two-part test for residual-clause analysis under § 4B1.2)
- Edling v. United States, 895 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.) (clarifying different inquiries for force, enumerated, and residual clauses)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisibility and modified categorical approach guidance)