870 F.3d 622
7th Cir.2017Background
- Defendants Antonio Walter and Kenneth Bell were convicted after a jury trial for a heroin-distribution conspiracy (charged for conduct through Nov. 2010); convictions relied entirely on accomplice testimony, no direct physical evidence linking them to the conspiracy.
- Key government witness Edmund Forrest testified under a plea deal and portrayed himself as having given up dealing while cooperating; his detailed testimony corroborated other jailhouse witnesses.
- DuShae Nesbitt, a government witness who later testified, told FBI Agent Helen Dunn during a hallway conversation (while trial was ongoing) that Forrest was still "at the table" selling drugs for a supplier called "KMART." The prosecution learned of this but did not disclose it to defense counsel until months after the verdict.
- The government also elicited testimony from an officer that Operation Blue Knight included recorded controlled buys by Bell; defense argued that admission of that prior-act evidence violated Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
- Defendants moved for a new trial alleging (1) Brady violation for nondisclosure of Nesbitt’s hallway statements (impeachment evidence) and (2) erroneous admission under Rule 404(b) of evidence of Bell’s prior controlled sales; the district court denied relief and defendants appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether admission of testimony about Bell’s prior controlled buys violated Rule 404(b) | Bell: prior-sale testimony was offered only to show propensity to deal drugs, not a non-propensity purpose | Gov: testimony rebutted Bell’s misleading implication that he was never caught; admissible to correct the record | Court: admission was questionable under Gomez; limiting instruction incomplete, but harmlessness not finally resolved because Brady error required new trial |
| Whether the government violated Brady by not disclosing Nesbitt’s hallway statements promptly | Bell/Walter: Nesbitt’s statements were favorable impeachment evidence, suppressed, and material because case turned on witness credibility | Gov: defendants already knew or had cues about Forrest’s ongoing conduct; evidence not material given other impeachment of Forrest and overall record | Court: Brady violated — statements were favorable, suppressed, and material (reasonable probability of different outcome); convictions vacated and remanded for new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose favorable, material evidence)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality: reasonable probability result would differ)
- United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (framework for distinguishing propensity vs. non-propensity use of other-act evidence under Rule 404(b))
- United States v. Walker, 746 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 2014) (standard for Brady elements and review)
- United States v. Morales, 746 F.3d 310 (7th Cir. 2014) (Brady nondisclosure excused when defense already possessed evidence)
- Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (timeliness rules for post-verdict motions are not jurisdictional)
- United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995) (impeachment showing witness lied about reform could undermine credibility and testimony)
- United States v. Curtis, 781 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2015) (Rule 404(b) admissibility review is abuse-of-discretion)
- United States v. Dvorkin, 799 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2015) (harmless-error standard for evidentiary mistakes)
