980 F.3d 377
4th Cir.2020Background
- Federal-state task force sought to execute an arrest warrant for Kendrick Brinkley and used CJLEADS and Facebook to locate him; two recent CJLEADS entries linked him to an apartment on Stoney Trace Drive.
- ATF Special Agent Murphy and Detective Stark believed Stoney Trace was the most likely address but did not investigate several other CJLEADS addresses (including one tied to a utility bill).
- Five uniformed officers performed a morning (≈8:30 AM) knock-and-talk at the Stoney Trace apartment; occupant Brittany Chisholm opened in pajamas, denied Brinkley was there, appeared nervous, and officers heard movement from the back of the unit.
- Officers, asserting they had an arrest warrant for Brinkley and believed he was inside, entered the apartment without a search warrant, found and arrested Brinkley, conducted a protective sweep, and later obtained a search warrant to seize firearms.
- Brinkley moved to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless entry; the district court denied suppression, he appealed after conditional plea, and the Fourth Circuit reversed, vacated convictions, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Brinkley) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard under Payton: does “reason to believe” require probable cause? | Majority: Payton’s “reason to believe” requires probable cause to protect home privacy. | Dissent/Gov’t: “reason to believe” means a lower standard (reasonable belief). | Majority: "reason to believe" equals probable cause. |
| Payton prong 1 — Did officers have probable cause Brinkley resided at Stoney Trace? | No: CJLEADS showed multiple addresses, officers failed to corroborate or rule out alternatives; evidence of residency was too thin. | Yes: Two recent CJLEADS entries (traffic stop and DOC/probation) plus Facebook linking to occupant supported residence inference. | No: information did not establish probable cause of residence. |
| Payton prong 2 — Did officers have probable cause Brinkley would be present when they entered? | No: noises, occupant nervousness, and time of day only indicated someone was home, not specifically Brinkley; officers lacked independent corroboration. | Yes: time of day, noises, occupants’ behavior, and officer experience gave reasonable basis to believe Brinkley was inside. | No: facts did not rise to probable cause of presence. |
| Remedy | Suppression of evidence obtained after unlawful entry (and vacatur of related convictions and sentence). | Government sought to uphold entry and convictions. | Court reversed denial of suppression, vacated convictions and sentence, and remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (arrest warrant permits entry into suspect’s own dwelling when there is reason to believe suspect is inside)
- Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (arrest warrant does not authorize entry into third party’s home absent consent or a search warrant)
- Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (discussed interplay of arrest warrants and probable cause to believe suspect is in the home)
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (standards of review for probable cause and reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 2011) (Payton analysis; courts apply two-prong test for residence and presence)
- United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467 (3d Cir. 2016) (circuit discussion on whether Payton’s "reason to believe" equals probable cause)
- United States v. Graham, 553 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2009) (utility bills and corroborating records as strong evidence of residence)
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (special solicitude for the home under the Fourth Amendment)