United States v. Kelly, 676 F.3d 912

Appellants Stephen Kelly, Lynne Greenwald, William Bichsel, Susan Crane, and Anne Montgomery, peace activists, trespassed at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor on November 2, 2009.
They cut through two fences, entered a secure area, spread simulated blood, and unfurled a banner reading 'Plowshares — Trident Illegal and Immoral.'
Marines detained the protesters and the United States prosecuted them for conspiracy to trespass, to destroy property in the special territorial jurisdiction, and to injure property worth more than $1,000 under 18 U.S.C. § 371.
The jury separately convicted them of underlying trespass (18 U.S.C. § 1382), destruction of property within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction (18 U.S.C. § 1363), and injury to property of the United States valued over $1,000 (18 U.S.C. § 1361).
Appellants argued the Hague Convention superseded these statutes and that the district court erred by not instructing on an international-law defense.
The district court initially barred evidence or argument about international law at trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Hague Convention preempt 18 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1363, 1382?	Hague Convention supersedes federal statutes.	Convention not self-executing and does not preempt; later statutes control.	No preemption; district court correct.
Did the district court err by not instructing jurors on an international-law defense?	International-law defense should have been available to the jury.	No defense since Hague Convention does not supersede domestic law.	No error; no applicable international-law defense.
Whether 'maliciously' in § 1363 requires hate or ill will, and sufficiency of evidence of malice.	Malice requires actual ill will toward property owner.	Malice aligns with common-law 'intent to commit act' plus lack of justification.	Jury instruction correct; evidence sufficient.
Whether the common-law meaning of malice governs § 1363 mens rea.	Common-law malice applies as standard.	Same as above; no broader or different standard warranted.	Common-law malice applied; no error.

Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (Supreme Court (2008)) (treaties and self-executing norms; domestic effect depends on self-execution)
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (Supreme Court (1888)) (treaty and federal law have equal footing; later law controls conflicts)
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (Supreme Court (1933)) (later federal law prevails in treaty-statute conflicts)
Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. (1992)) ( Hague Convention not self-executing; domestic statutes govern)
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. (1985)) (self-executing treaties depend on practical execution; domestic law priority)
United States v. Doe, 136 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. (1998)) (malice meaning in common-law contexts informs statutory interpretation)
In re Bammer, 131 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. (1997)) (malicious in bankruptcy context; historical common-law scope)
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court (1975)) (malice and willfulness concepts in criminal liability)