United States v. Kelli Hogue, 66 F.4th 756

Kelli Hogue, a former Arkansas attorney, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344(2)) and one count of theft of government funds (18 U.S.C. § 641) based on embezzling ≈$669,600 from Runyan Sewer District and improperly receiving ≈$120,523 in Social Security disability benefits while employed.
Hogue filed fraudulent tax returns (2018–2020) and received multiple large refunds (total ≈$3.99 million, per agent testimony).
After indictment she submitted restitution to SSA, but before sentencing she produced four falsified support letters (pastor and three doctors) and made inconsistent statements about the source of funds used for restitution. She stipulated to forging those letters.
The plea agreement preserved eligibility for a 2–3 level acceptance-of-responsibility reduction but conditioned it on no inconsistent post-plea conduct; Hogue also agreed to provide truthful financial statements and to notify the government before transferring significant assets.
At sentencing the court denied a 2-level acceptance reduction, admitted and relied on Hogue’s tax filings and refund evidence, calculated a Guidelines range of 46–57 months, and imposed an upward-variance sentence of 96 months.
Hogue appealed, arguing the court erroneously denied acceptance-of-responsibility, improperly admitted/considered tax evidence, and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Denial of acceptance-of-responsibility (U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1)	Hogue: Post-plea falsified letters and inconsistent statements are unrelated to acceptance for the offenses she pled to and thus should not preclude the reduction.	Govt: The falsified letters and false statements demonstrate ongoing dishonesty and obstruction inconsistent with acceptance; denial appropriate.	Affirmed — court’s factual findings (forged letters; false statements about source of restitution funds) supported denial; not clearly erroneous.
Admission/consideration of tax returns at sentencing	Hogue: Tax-return fraud was unrelated to the charged offenses and should not have been admitted/considered.	Govt: The fraudulent tax filings are relevant uncharged conduct that continue the same pattern of dishonest behavior and inform § 3553(a) factors.	Affirmed — district court permissibly considered the tax evidence (found fraudulent by preponderance) as relevant conduct and § 3553 material.
Substantive reasonableness of 96-month sentence	Hogue: 96 months is a large upward variance without extraordinary circumstances.	Govt: Offense was brazen, prolonged, breach of trust, escalating criminal history, and deterrence/ respect for law justify upward variance.	Affirmed — sentence within district court’s broad discretion; § 3553(a) factors adequately considered and weighed.

Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022) (district courts have broad discretion to consider relevant information at sentencing)
United States v. Gant, 663 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2011) (sentencing inquiry may be broad; district court may consider uncharged conduct and uncorroborated hearsay if reliable)
United States v. Thomas, 760 F.3d 879 (8th Cir. 2014) (district court may base sentence on judge-found facts and uncharged conduct so long as under statutory maximum)
United States v. Gonzalez, 781 F.3d 422 (8th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for acceptance-of-responsibility rulings; district court in unique position)
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness review)
United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 2010) (deference to district judge’s sentencing judgment)
United States v. Campbell, 986 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 2021) (district court has wide latitude to weigh § 3553(a) factors)
United States v. Adams, 451 F.3d 471 (8th Cir. 2006) (clear-error review of relevant-conduct findings)