United States v. Keith Young, 943 F.3d 460

Keith Young was convicted of possessing a heroin mixture >2 kg and, as a felon, possessing a firearm; the government filed a §851 information citing a 1994 cocaine-distribution conviction that triggered the then-20-year mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
The district court sentenced Young on July 19, 2018 to the 240-month statutory minimum on the heroin count (plus 36 months concurrent on the firearms count).
The First Step Act was enacted December 21, 2018 and narrowed the prior-conviction predicate by replacing “felony drug offense” with “serious drug felony,” a term that would exclude Young’s 1994 conviction because release was more than 15 years before the instant offense.
Section 401(c) of the Act provides retroactivity only for offenses committed before enactment “if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.”
Young appealed, arguing that because his case was pending on direct review when the Act was enacted, his sentence was not yet “imposed” and he should receive the lower (10-year) mandatory minimum.
The D.C. Circuit held that a sentence is “imposed” when the district court pronounces it; because Young’s sentence was imposed before December 21, 2018, the First Step Act’s amendment did not apply, and the district court’s judgment was affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §401(c) of the First Step Act applies when a defendant’s sentence was imposed by the district court before enactment but the case was pending on direct appeal	Young: a sentence is not "imposed" until final judgment on direct review, so §401(c) applies	Gov: a sentence is "imposed" when the district court pronounces it; Young was sentenced before enactment, so §401(c) does not apply	The court held "imposed" means district-court pronouncement; §401(c) does not apply to Young and judgment affirmed
Whether ambiguity, rule of lenity, or remedial/constitutional concerns require applying the Act to Young	Young: rule of lenity, remedial purpose, and due-process/equal-protection concerns favor applying the Act	Gov: statute is unambiguous; ordinary interpretation forecloses lenity; remedial purpose cannot override plain text	The court found no grievous ambiguity, declined lenity, and held statutory text controls

Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (explained how ordinary interpretive considerations can show Congress intended retroactivity despite savings clause)
Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605 (1973) (described the common-law rule favoring application of reduced penalties on direct review)
Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974) (held 1 U.S.C. § 109 abrogated common-law presumption about abatement/retroactivity)
United States v. Clark, 110 F.3d 15 (6th Cir. 1997) (held, contrastingly, that a sentence is not "imposed" until final appellate disposition)
United States v. Pierson, 925 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2019) (held "imposed" refers to district-court pronouncement; First Step Act not retroactive to sentences imposed before enactment)
United States v. Aviles, 938 F.3d 503 (3d Cir. 2019) (held First Step Act does not apply to sentences imposed before enactment even if on appeal)
United States v. Wiseman, 932 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. 2019) (same holding)
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (explained that the rule of lenity applies only when a statute presents a grievous ambiguity)