United States v. Keith Studhorse, II, 883 F.3d 1198

Keith Studhorse was indicted on two counts: felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and violent felon in possession of body armor (18 U.S.C. § 931(a)).
Studhorse moved to dismiss Count 2, arguing his three Washington convictions (attempted first-degree murder, second-degree manslaughter, riot with a deadly weapon) did not qualify as "crimes of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16.
The district court denied the motion, holding that attempted first-degree murder under Washington law is a "crime of violence," and Studhorse pleaded guilty under a conditional plea preserving the challenge.
At sentencing the PSR treated the attempted first-degree murder as a crime of violence, producing a base offense level of 20; the district court adopted the PSR but varied upward, sentencing Studhorse to 84 months.
On appeal Studhorse challenged (1) the denial of his motion to dismiss Count 2 and (2) the guideline classification under USSG § 4B1.2(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Washington attempted first-degree murder is a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)	Government: it qualifies because the offense requires intent and involves use/attempted/threatened physical force	Studhorse: Washington attempt can be overbroad; a "slight act" might not involve intentional use of force	Held: Yes. Washington attempt requires specific intent and a substantial step that necessarily involves intentional/ threatened/ attempted use of physical force, so it fits § 16(a).
Whether attempted first-degree murder qualifies as a "crime of violence" under USSG § 4B1.2(a) and whether the Guidelines commentary is authoritative	Government: Commentary and § 4B1.2(a) include attempted murder; commentary is authoritative under Stinson	Studhorse: Commentary is non-authoritative under administrative-law principles and § 4B1.2(a)(2) is unclear	Held: Yes. The commentary is authoritative (Stinson) and the conviction also satisfies § 4B1.2(a)(1)’s text.

United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (Sup. Ct.) (intentional causation of bodily injury involves use of physical force)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (Sup. Ct.) (physical force means violent force; mens rea requirement discussion)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (Sup. Ct.) (categorical approach: compare elements to generic federal definition)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (Sup. Ct.) (presume conviction rests on least culpable conduct criminalized)
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (Sup. Ct.) (Guidelines commentary authoritative unless unconstitutional or plainly erroneous)
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (Sup. Ct.) (attempted murder is prototypically violent)
Dixon, 805 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir.) (requirements for categorical match: violent force and intentional use)
Cornejo-Villagrana v. Sessions, 870 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir.) (applying Castleman to § 16(a); intentional/knowing conduct involves violent force)