United States v. Keith Cooper
750 F.3d 263
3rd Cir.2014Background
- Cooper was convicted of first-degree rape in Oklahoma in 1999, paroled in January 2006, and initially registered under pre‑SORNA law.
- Congress enacted SORNA in July 2006, requiring sex offenders to register and update registration on changes of name, address, employment, or student status; §16913(d) delegated to the Attorney General authority to specify SORNA’s applicability to pre‑Act offenders.
- The Attorney General issued rules in 2007 (and a final rule effective 2011) applying SORNA retroactively to pre‑SORNA offenders; Cooper moved to Delaware circa 2011 and did not update his registration.
- In 2012 Cooper was charged under 18 U.S.C. §2250(a) for failure to register after interstate travel; he pled guilty but reserved a nondelegation challenge on appeal to §16913(d).
- The District Court denied Cooper’s motion to dismiss; on appeal the Third Circuit reviewed the nondelegation claim de novo and affirmed Cooper’s conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §16913(d) unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the Attorney General | Cooper: delegation to AG to decide retroactivity of SORNA for pre‑Act offenders lacks adequate limiting standards and thus violates nondelegation | Government: Congress provided an intelligible principle via SORNA’s objectives, definitions, and procedural sections; §16913(d) simply fills implementation details | The delegation passes the intelligible‑principle test and is constitutional; conviction affirmed |
| Whether a heightened "meaningfully constrains" standard applies because delegated authority implicates criminal liability | Cooper: when delegation authorizes criminal liability, courts should require stricter limits than the intelligible principle | Government: Supreme Court has not required a stricter standard; apply established intelligible‑principle test | Court declines to adopt a heightened standard and applies the intelligible‑principle test |
Key Cases Cited
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upheld delegation under the intelligible‑principle test)
- J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (articulated intelligible‑principle standard)
- Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidated delegation lacking any standards)
- A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidated overly broad delegation to approve industry codes)
- Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (confirmed modern nondelegation boundaries and continued use of intelligible‑principle test)
- Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upheld delegation where statute supplied guiding standards)
- Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010) (explained that once subject to SORNA, failure to register after interstate travel can support §2250 conviction)
- Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825) (early recognition that Congress can leave details to others after establishing general policy)