945 F.3d 929
5th Cir.2019Background
- On Sept. 3, 2017, two uniformed, marked officers went to a Corinth, MS home to serve an arrest warrant; the residence was testified to be a "known drug house."
- A black Camaro was parked in the driveway; Justin Darrell exited the vehicle seconds after the officers arrived and walked toward the side/rear of the house.
- An officer ordered Darrell to stop; Darrell initially ignored the command and increased his pace but complied on a second order.
- Officers took a paper bag from Darrell (containing alcohol), observed two knives on his belt, patted him down, and discovered a loaded pistol (with obliterated serial number) and a methamphetamine-like substance; Darrell was handcuffed and later indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- Darrell moved to suppress, arguing lack of reasonable suspicion for the seizure; the district court denied the motion, Darrell pleaded conditionally, and the Fifth Circuit majority affirmed (with a dissent).
Issues
| Issue | Darrell's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize Darrell under Terry | Darrell: his brief walking away was equally consistent with innocuous conduct (arriving at destination), not "unprovoked flight," so no reasonable suspicion | Gov: presence at a known drug house + immediate movement away from officers (increasing pace toward out-of-sight area) supports reasonable suspicion under Wardlow | Majority: reasonable suspicion existed (totality: high-crime location + evasive movement); stop upheld |
| Whether Wardlow controls and permits a Terry stop based on flight in a high-crime area | Darrell: Wardlow involved head‑long flight; here movement was a brisk walk and ambiguous — Hill/Alexander show that equivocal movements do not create suspicion | Gov: analogous to Wardlow; facts here clearer than Wardlow (marked cars, uniforms, no one else present) so Wardlow applies | Majority: applied Wardlow reasoning and distinguished Hill/Monsivais; stop valid |
| Whether officer-safety/concern that Darrell could warn the warrant target or retrieve a weapon justified the seizure | Darrell: officers lacked particularized facts that he would warn or arm himself; such safety rationales cannot substitute for reasonable suspicion | Gov: officers reasonably feared he could arm himself or warn the target if allowed to leave sight, supporting a brief stop | Majority: officer safety and risk of warning were reasonable concerns contributing to suspicion; stop still analyzed under Terry (not Summers) and upheld |
| Whether evidence obtained after seizure (liquor, knives, gun) may be used to justify the stop | Darrell: post-seizure discoveries cannot be used to justify the initial stop | Gov: relied on pre-seizure facts (location and movement) to justify stop; evidence corroborated danger after the fact | Court: agreed evidence obtained after the seizure cannot retroactively justify the stop, but found pre-seizure facts sufficient on their own |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes investigatory stop and limited frisk standards)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (flight in a high‑crime area may contribute significant weight to reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 1029 (5th Cir. 2014) (officers lacked reasonable suspicion where contemporaneous, ambiguous movements could equally indicate innocent conduct)
- United States v. Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2017) (nervousness or continued walking, without more, did not supply reasonable suspicion)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (Terry stop requires reasonable suspicion; distinguishes investigatory detention from consensual encounters)
- Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (warrant‑incident detentions of premises occupants are permitted, but the Court has not extended Summers to arrests executed by arrest warrants in the same way)