United States v. Junior Roldan Marin, 31 F.4th 1049

In Oct. 2016 Roldan-Marin pled guilty to domestic abuse assault in Iowa; the judgment included a no-contact order finding the victim was an "intimate partner."
In Dec. 2018 police encountered Roldan-Marin, who admitted a shotgun was in his residence; officers found a shotgun, ammunition, and small amounts of marijuana/paraphernalia.
A federal indictment charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as (1) an unlawful user of a controlled substance, (2) a person subject to a domestic no-contact order, and (3) a person previously convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; the jury convicted on all counts.
Post-trial, the district court sentenced him to 66 months and denied his motion for acquittal or a new trial.
On appeal Roldan-Marin argued (1) insufficient evidence he knowingly was a prohibited person under § 922(g)(8), (2) prosecutorial misconduct for misstating the presumption of innocence, and (3) erroneous Guidelines enhancement treating his Iowa assault as a "crime of violence."
The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it sustained the § 922(g)(8) conviction, found the prosecutor’s remark improper but harmless, and held any Guidelines error was harmless because the court would have imposed the same sentence under § 3553(a).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence that defendant knowingly was subject to a no-contact order under § 922(g)(8)	Government: plea, judgment, served order, and probation documents show intimate-partner status, opportunity to participate in hearing, and order remained in effect	Roldan-Marin: insufficient proof he knew he was subject to an order; lacked opportunity to participate; believed order ended after discharge from probation	Affirmed. Evidence was sufficient: intimate-partner finding in record, counsel was present so opportunity to participate met, Iowa law presumes order continues and judgment extended the no-contact period
Prosecutorial misconduct—misstatement about presumption of innocence in closing	Government: argued evidence presented removed presumption (improperly)	Roldan-Marin: remark misstated law and prejudiced jury	Remark was improper but harmless under plain-error review: isolated, evidence strong, district court cured with proper jury instruction
Sentencing—whether Iowa assault was a "crime of violence" for §2K2.1 enhancement	Government: used prior assault conviction to increase base offense level	Roldan-Marin: prior conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence; enhancement improper	Even if enhancement erroneous, error was harmless: district court stated it would impose the same sentence after considering §3553(a) factors; affirmed

Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (government must prove defendant knew he belonged to the prohibited category)
United States v. Bramer, 956 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2020) (context on opportunity to participate where defendant lacked counsel)
Kellogg v. Skon, 176 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 1999) (prosecutorial remark that presumption of innocence was "removed" is improper)
United States v. Crumley, 528 F.3d 1053 (8th Cir. 2008) (plain-error review; improper prosecutorial remarks can be cured by jury instruction)
United States v. Darden, 688 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 2012) (factors for assessing prejudice from prosecutorial misconduct)
United States v. Thibeaux, 784 F.3d 1221 (8th Cir. 2015) (Guidelines misapplication harmless where court would impose same sentence after §3553(a) analysis)