United States v. Julian Garcon, 997 F.3d 1301

Julian Garcon pleaded guilty to attempted possession with intent to distribute 500+ grams of cocaine, an offense carrying a 5-year statutory minimum sentence.
The PSI calculated a Guidelines range of 41–51 months (offense level 21) but the statutory minimum raised the applicable sentence to 60 months; the PSI noted a prior three‑point conviction (possession of a firearm by a felon) putting Garcon in Criminal History Category II.
Garcon sought "safety valve" relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), which excludes defendants who “do not have—(A) more than 4 criminal history points; (B) a prior 3‑point offense; and (C) a prior 2‑point violent offense.”
The district court read the word "and" conjunctively and granted safety‑valve relief because Garcon had only a prior 3‑point offense, not all three listed conditions.
The government appealed, arguing the "and" is disjunctive (so meeting any one listed prior‑offense criterion disqualifies eligibility); the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding the "and" is disjunctive, vacating and remanding for resentencing.
The court’s reasoning relied principally on the canon against surplusage (conjunctive reading would render subsection (A) redundant) and the related conjunctive negative‑proof canon (noted in concurrence) to interpret § 3553(f)(1).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the "and" in § 3553(f)(1)(A)–(C) is conjunctive (must meet all three to be disqualified) or disjunctive (meeting any one disqualifies)	Garcon: read conjunctively—safety valve barred only if defendant has all three listed prior conditions	Government: read disjunctively—safety valve barred if defendant has any one of the listed prior conditions	The court held the "and" is disjunctive; meeting any one listed prior‑offense criterion disqualifies a defendant from safety‑valve relief (Garcon ineligible)
Whether to apply the rule of lenity if ambiguity exists	Garcon: if ambiguity remains, apply lenity in favor of defendant	Government: statutory text and structure resolve meaning; lenity not triggered	Court: no grievous ambiguity after textual and structural analysis, so lenity did not apply

Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (requirement to give effect to every word in a statute)
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (canon against surplusage supports avoiding superfluous provisions)
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018) (statutory context can overcome ordinary meanings of connective words)
Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48 (2013) (rule of lenity applies only when grievous ambiguity remains)
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (some statutory ambiguity is insufficient to invoke lenity)
Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2005) (ordinary meaning of "and" is conjunctive unless context dictates otherwise)
One 1973 Rolls Royce v. United States, 43 F.3d 794 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussion of conjunctive negative‑proof canon in statutory lists)
Peacock v. Lubbock Compress Co., 252 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1958) ("and" can take different meanings from context)