United States v. Juan Perez, 956 F.3d 970

In Dec. 2016 law enforcement conducted a recorded controlled buy: Perez sold 98 g of heroin to an informant; he was charged only with that single distribution count.
The PSR described broader trafficking: informant tips that Perez was a high-level heroin/meth/cocaine supplier, multiple cell phones, alleged Sinaloa links, drug ledgers, large cash, DEA seizure notices, offers to sell pounds/kilos of drugs, and requests for firearms.
Probation conservatively attributed only the 98 g controlled buy to Perez, yielding a base offense level of 22 (reduced to 19 for acceptance) and a guidelines range of 33–41 months.
The district judge found a “grotesque mismatch” between the PSR’s depiction of large-scale trafficking and the 33–41 month range, continued sentencing, and ordered the government to identify what conduct it could prove by a preponderance.
On reconvening the government presented witness testimony (Cheryl Barrera and a police officer); the judge found by a preponderance that Perez supplied Barrera with 435 g of meth, recalculated the base offense level to 32 (combined heroin + meth), and imposed 121 months.
Perez appealed, arguing the judge should have recused under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding a reasonable observer would not question the judge’s impartiality.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the judge should have recused under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) after sua sponte continuing sentencing and ordering government briefing	Perez: continuance and request for evidence shows judge sought to build a harsher sentence and was biased	Government: judge properly fulfilled sentencing duties, sought reliable information to determine relevant conduct	No recusal; reasonable observer would not question impartiality
Whether relying on government’s new evidence and witness testimony at the continued hearing showed judicial bias	Perez: allowing adverse witnesses and using their testimony to increase guidelines shows judge assumed adversarial role and was predisposed	Government: judge allowed adversarial testing, assessed credibility, and limited reliance to reliable evidence	Reliance was proper; judge ensured due process and reliability, so no disqualifying bias

Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (U.S. 1988) (harmless-error factors for judicial disqualification)
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (U.S. 1994) (standard for judicial bias; deep-seated favoritism/antagonism required)
Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (U.S. 1993) (plain-error review framework)
Atwood, 941 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2019) (applying Liljeberg factors to § 455 harmlessness analysis)
Fowler v. Butts, 829 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2016) (judge’s duty to consider recusal and litigants’ role)
In re City of Milwaukee, 788 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2015) (recusal required only when fair judgment impossible)
United States v. Ritsema, 31 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 1994) (purpose of relevant-conduct inquiry in drug sentencing)
United States v. Taylor, 72 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 1995) (due-process requirement: sentencing evidence must have sufficient indicia of reliability)
United States v. Modjewski, 783 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2015) (judge’s role to fashion sentence based on reliable information)
United States v. Garrett, 528 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2008) (plain-error standard includes assessing effect on fairness, integrity, or reputation of proceedings)