United States v. Juan Mendez-Sosa, 778 F.3d 1117

Defendant Juan Alberto Mendez‑Sosa pled guilty in New Jersey to Criminal Sexual Contact (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:14‑3(b)) and later pleaded guilty in federal court to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
At sentencing the district court applied a 16‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), treating the New Jersey conviction as a prior “crime of violence.”
The court concluded federal (Chapter Four) definitions govern whether a state plea counts as a “conviction” for guideline purposes, not state law or the INA.
The district court applied the modified‑categorical approach to the divisible New Jersey statute and relied on the plea colloquy in which Mendez‑Sosa admitted touching the victim’s breasts without her consent.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed the 16‑level enhancement, holding (1) Chapter Four defines “conviction” for guideline application and (2) the offense qualified as a forcible sex offense (a crime of violence).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the relevant definition of “conviction” for §2L1.2 enhancement is federal or state law	Government: federal guidelines control; uniform national definition required	Mendez‑Sosa: he was not “convicted” under state or INA definitions, so enhancement improper	Federal law (Chapter Four of the Sentencing Guidelines) governs; his guilty plea counted as a conviction for guideline purposes
Whether New Jersey §2C:14‑3(b) conviction is a “crime of violence” under §2L1.2	Government: the statute is divisible and, based on the plea colloquy, the conviction was for the nonconsensual (forcible) alternative	Mendez‑Sosa: argued the offense did not necessarily involve lack of consent and thus not a forcible sex offense	The statute is divisible; modified‑categorical approach and plea colloquy show the offense involved lack of consent and is a forcible sex offense (crime of violence)

United States v. Leal‑Felix, 665 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.) (federal uniformity in definitions for sentencing enhancements)
United States v. Cuevas, 75 F.3d 778 (1st Cir.) (use of guideline definitions for sentencing calculations)
United States v. Pimentel‑Flores, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir.) (guideline definitions govern when different from statutory definitions)
United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir.) (standard of review for whether prior conviction is a crime of violence)
United States v. Gallegos‑Galindo, 704 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir.) (forcible sex offense includes any sex offense involving absence of consent)
United States v. Ruiz‑Apolonio, 657 F.3d 907 (9th Cir.) (consent‑based forcible sex offense analysis)
United States v. Quintero‑Junco, 754 F.3d 746 (9th Cir.) (divisible statutes and application of the modified‑categorical approach)