United States v. Juan Gil
14-50185
| 9th Cir. | Dec 13, 2017Background
- Juan Gil and Armando Barajas were convicted of RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); Barajas also convicted of conspiracy to distribute narcotics under 21 U.S.C. § 846.
- The prosecution relied on evidence from a federal wiretap, testimony from a cooperating witness (David Navarro), seized packages found during a prisoner strip search, and recorded telephone calls.
- The defense challenged the federal wiretap because state-authorized wiretaps had been used previously; they also contested the admission of Navarro’s lay testimony, the strip-search evidence, and the sufficiency of conspiracy proof.
- At sentencing, the court treated the RICO conspiracy as a crime of violence / controlled-substance offense for guideline enhancement based on predicate offenses; both defendants’ prior convictions were challenged as qualifying predicates.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed convictions and sentences on all grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of federal wiretap after prior state-authorized wiretaps | Government: state wiretaps are not "other" normal investigative procedures under 18 U.S.C. § 2518 and do not foreclose federal authorization | Defendants: prior state-authorized wiretaps meant federal application failed the § 2518(1)(c) / (3)(c) requirement that other methods be tried and failed | Affirmed: State-authorized wiretaps are not "other/normal" procedures under § 2518; admission of federal wiretap proper (citing Reed) |
| Admissibility of Navarro’s testimony as lay opinion | Government: Navarro’s interpretations of ambiguous recorded conversations are proper lay testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 701 | Defendants: Navarro’s interpretations were improper opinion testimony usurping the jury | Affirmed: Court did not abuse discretion; such interpretations allowed as lay testimony (citing Freeman) |
| Admission of packages seized during prisoner strip search | Government: gang regularly smuggled drugs into prison; one package was intended for Gil | Defendants: seizure evidence was inadmissible or irrelevant | Affirmed: District court did not abuse discretion admitting packages given contextual evidence linking them to the conspiracy |
| Jury question on whether "threat" must be explicit or implied | Government: implied threats suffice under extortion law | Defendants: requested further definition of "implied threat" | Affirmed: Court’s answer (explicit or implied) was legally correct and not misleading; no abuse in declining extended definition (citing Frega, McIver) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for Gil’s conspiracy conviction | Government: call recordings and witness testimony showed Gil’s financial dependence on conspiracy success | Defendants: evidence insufficient / credibility issues | Affirmed: Sufficient evidence supports conviction; credibility for jury (citing Lyda) |
| Sentencing: whether RICO conspiracy qualifies as crime of violence / controlled-substance offense for guideline enhancement | Government: predicate offenses (extortion, controlled-substance statutes) established qualifying conduct under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 | Defendants: challenge to characterization of predicates and reliance on residual clause / prior convictions | Affirmed: Court reasonably concluded qualifying predicates proved; enhancement proper (citing Scott, Mercado) |
| Prior convictions as qualifying predicates (Gil’s methamphetamine conviction; Barajas’s §459 burglary) | Government: prior convictions qualify as prior controlled-substance or crime of violence for enhancement | Defendants: argued timing, categorical mismatch, or vagueness / Descamps/Johnson concerns | Affirmed: Gil’s 2005 conviction qualifies; §459 categorically fits residual clause under Park; Descamps/Johnson not inconsistent with Park and vagueness challenge foreclosed by Beckles |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900 (9th Cir.) (state-authorized wiretaps are not "other" normal investigative procedures under § 2518)
- United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893 (9th Cir.) (permissible lay testimony interpreting ambiguous conversations)
- United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir.) (standards for jury note responses and when they are legally sufficient)
- United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.) (declining to define "implied threat" in jury instruction questions)
- Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.) (witness credibility is for the jury)
- United States v. Scott, 642 F.3d 791 (9th Cir.) (look to predicate offenses to determine RICO conspiracy characterization for guidelines)
- United States v. Mercado, 474 F.3d 654 (9th Cir.) (crime-of-violence conclusion based on predicate offenses)
- United States v. Park, 649 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir.) (California §459 burglary falls within §4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (Sup. Ct.) (rejecting vagueness challenge to Sentencing Guidelines' residual clause)