United States v. Juan Garcia-Perez
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3252
| 5th Cir. | 2015Background
- Defendant Juan Garcia-Perez, brought to the U.S. as an infant, pled no contest in 1996 to Florida manslaughter (Fla. Stat. § 782.07(1)) and was deported; he later reentered and pleaded guilty in 2013 to unlawful reentry after deportation following an aggravated felony.
- Probation calculated a base offense level 8 under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) and added a 16-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because the probation officer treated the Florida manslaughter conviction as a "crime of violence;" final offense level became 21 and the district court sentenced him to 87 months.
- Garcia-Perez objected below that Florida manslaughter is not a "crime of violence" because the statute lacks a force element and covers conduct broader than generic manslaughter; the district court overruled the objection.
- On appeal the Fifth Circuit reviewed the preserved objection de novo, focusing on whether the Florida statute (1) contains an element of force or (2) falls within the Guidelines' generic contemporary meaning of "manslaughter."
- The court analyzed Florida caselaw on manslaughter by act, procurement, and culpable negligence and concluded § 782.07(1) lacks a force element and that the act/procurement prongs permit convictions without proof of recklessness as to death.
- Holding: Florida manslaughter under § 782.07(1) is not a "crime of violence" for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii); the 16-level enhancement was erroneous, so the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Garcia-Perez's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Florida manslaughter § 782.07(1) contains an element of force sufficient to qualify as a "crime of violence" under the force prong | § 782.07(1) does not require use of destructive or violent force; elements are death and causation, not force | Argued enhancement appropriate (did not dispute lack of force element) | No — statute lacks an element of force; force prong not satisfied |
| Whether Florida manslaughter fits the Guidelines' "generic contemporary" definition of manslaughter (i.e., requires intent to kill or recklessness as to death) | Act and procurement prongs do not require recklessness as to death; statute covers less culpable mental states and thus is broader than generic manslaughter | Relied on precedent treating Florida culpable-negligence prong as equivalent to recklessness; argued statute aligns with generic manslaughter | No — Florida act/procurement manslaughter can be based on conduct not meeting generic manslaughter's recklessness/intent standard, so statute is broader |
| Whether the district court's application of the 16-level enhancement was harmless error | Enhancement materially increased Guidelines range; lower enhancement would produce much lower range — thus error not harmless | Government bore burden to show the same sentence would have been imposed absent error; did not carry burden | Error was not harmless; remand for resentencing |
| Standard of appellate review: whether objection was preserved for de novo review | Objection below challenged use of manslaughter as a crime of violence and thus preserved the claim on appeal | Government urged plain-error review because arguments were refined on appeal | Preserved — de novo review applied because the district court had fair opportunity to address the core objection |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d 647 (5th Cir.) (defendant bears burden to show state offense broader than generic offense for crime-of-violence analysis)
- United States v. Dominguez-Ochoa, 386 F.3d 639 (5th Cir.) (use elements-of-the-crime approach; define generic offense uniformly)
- United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d 598 (5th Cir.) (force prong requires use of destructive or violent force as element)
- United States v. Herrera-Alvarez, 753 F.3d 132 (5th Cir.) (government must prove sentencing enhancement predicate by preponderance; interpret Guideline definitions)
- United States v. Ibarra-Luna, 628 F.3d 712 (5th Cir.) (government must show district court would have imposed same sentence to establish harmlessness of Guideline error)
- State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010) (Florida manslaughter by act requires intent to commit the act that caused death, not intent to kill)
- Baker v. State, 11 So. 492 (Fla. 1892) (historic Florida precedent holding unanticipated death from intentional act can sustain manslaughter conviction)