34 F.4th 326
4th Cir.2022Background:
- Dec. 30, 2016: victim Elton Wright was shot and carjacked; shell casings recovered at scene later linked to a .45 Rock Island firearm.
- Dec. 31, 2016: D.C. police arrested Medley and recovered a Rock Island .45 and a Glock; D.C. court appointed counsel for Medley before the Maryland detectives interviewed him in D.C.
- Prince George’s County Detective Dalton, Mirandized Medley in the D.C. jail about the Maryland carjacking; Medley answered that he bought and solely possessed the Rock Island firearm days earlier.
- Federal indictment charged Medley with carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119), § 924(c) offense, and felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); at trial Medley was acquitted of the carjacking and § 924(c) counts but convicted of felon-in-possession.
- At sentencing the PSR applied a four-level U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement for using the firearm in connection with another felony (the carjacking); district court found that fact by a preponderance and sentenced Medley to 78 months.
- On appeal Medley challenged (1) admission of his uncounseled statements (Sixth Amendment right to counsel) and (2) the Guidelines enhancement as based on acquitted conduct and as factually unsupported.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Medley) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether admission of statements violated Sixth Amendment right to counsel where Medley had counsel in D.C. | Medley: D.C. appointment meant Sixth Amendment right had attached for the same felon-in-possession offense; statements were taken without counsel and any waiver was not knowing because Dalton misled him about the scope of questioning. | Govt: Right is offense-specific and had not attached for federal charge; even assuming attachment, Medley did not unambiguously invoke counsel and validly waived Miranda rights; Dalton did not trick Medley regarding the federal investigation. | Court: Affirmed. Even assuming right attached, Medley never clearly invoked counsel and knowingly waived after Miranda; no deception shown that voided the waiver. |
| Whether using acquitted conduct to apply Guidelines enhancement violated Sixth Amendment jury right | Medley: Enhancement impermissibly relies on conduct for which he was acquitted, violating the jury-trial guarantee. | Govt: Binding Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent allow judges to consider acquitted or uncharged conduct by a preponderance when Guidelines are advisory and sentence is within statutory maximum. | Court: Rejected Medley’s constitutional challenge as foreclosed by precedent (Watts, Grubbs, etc.). |
| Whether district court’s factual finding that Medley used the firearm in the carjacking was clearly erroneous | Medley: Eyewitness descriptions were inconsistent; ballistics and cell-site evidence were unreliable and insufficient. | Govt: Multiple eyewitness identifications, firearms examiner linked shell casings to the Rock Island firearm, and cell-site data placed Medley’s phone near the scene shortly before the crime. | Court: Affirmed. Under deferential clear-error review, the preponderance finding was not against the clear weight of the evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (Miranda waiver can constitute a knowing Sixth Amendment waiver; government may initiate contact with represented defendants)
- Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and attaches at commencement of adversarial proceedings)
- McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (same-offense/offense-specific analysis for right to counsel)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (request for counsel must be clear and unambiguous to invoke right)
- Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (Miranda warnings can render a Sixth Amendment waiver knowing and voluntary)
- Watts v. United States, 519 U.S. 148 (acquittal does not bar consideration of underlying conduct at sentencing if proven by a preponderance)
- Grubbs v. United States, 585 F.3d 793 (4th Cir.) (sentencing courts may consider acquitted or uncharged conduct for advisory Guidelines calculation)
- United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501 (4th Cir.) (standard of review for suppression rulings: factual findings for clear error; legal conclusions de novo)