United States v. Joseph Pritchard
692 F. App'x 349
9th Cir.2017Background
- Defendants Ronnie Johnson and Joseph Pritchard were convicted of conspiracy to commit bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 371), armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),(d)-(e)), and using a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
- The government presented DNA expert Jeanne Putinier, who testified about random match probabilities derived from laboratory data.
- Pritchard challenged the § 924(c) conviction on the ground that armed bank robbery under § 2113(a) & (d) is not a "crime of violence."
- Johnson challenged his § 924(c) conviction on sufficiency grounds, arguing liability could not be predicated on aiding/abetting or Pinkerton co‑conspirator liability for a brandishing offense.
- Pritchard contested a two‑level sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight; Johnson challenged a consecutive 24‑month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release as substantively unreasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of DNA expert testimony on random match probabilities | Putinier’s expert opinion based on lab data was proper expert testimony and admissible | Defendants: testimony was impermissible hearsay via Rule 703 conduit | Admitted: expert applied training to data (not mere hearsay); even if hearsay, probative value outweighed prejudice; no error |
| Whether armed bank robbery (§2113(a)) is a "crime of violence" for §924(c) | Government: prior Ninth Circuit precedent treats §2113(a) armed bank robbery as a crime of violence | Pritchard: §2113(a) does not meet §924(c)(3) "crime of violence" definition after Johnson v. United States | Affirmed: Ninth Circuit precedent controls; intimidation/ threatened force meets requirement; conviction under §924(c) stands |
| Sufficiency of evidence / Pinkerton and aiding and abetting for §924(c) brandishing | Government: Johnson had advance knowledge, furnished the gun, aided planning—sufficient for aiding/abetting or Pinkerton liability | Johnson: insufficient proof of aiding/abetting; Pinkerton not a valid basis here | Affirmed: evidence sufficient to support aiding/abetting; Pinkerton theory (if reviewable) not plainly erroneous; §924(c) conviction upheld |
| Sentencing: (a) reckless endangerment enhancement for Pritchard; (b) consecutive supervised release revocation term for Johnson | Government: facts (throwing money from car, bringing/handing gun, fleeing into crowded mall) support enhancement and consecutive term under guidelines | Pritchard: not personally responsible / his conduct not reckless; Johnson: consecutive 24 months is substantively unreasonable and punitive double-counting | Affirmed: district court did not clearly err on enhancement; consecutive supervised‑release term not an abuse of discretion given guidelines and circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gomez, 725 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2013) (expert may apply training to sources and render independent judgment)
- United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2009) (discussing expert opinion application to source material)
- United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) (armed bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence)
- United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1990) (intimidation element satisfies threatened use of physical force)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining requirement of "violent force")
- Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (aiding and abetting standard for firearms offenses and knowledge requirement)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (co‑conspirator liability for foreseeable offenses of the conspiracy)
- United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2008) (standard of review for sentencing: abuse of discretion)