United States v. Jose Henriquez, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12145

Henriquez pled guilty to unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. §1326(a),(b)(2) and received a 16-level enhancement for a prior Maryland first-degree burglary under U.S.S.G. §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).
The 16-level enhancement hinged on Maryland’s first-degree burglary; district court treated it as a crime of violence.
Taylor defined generic burglary for ACCA and guided the analysis for the Guidelines’ “burglary of a dwelling” requirement.
Shepard held generic burglary excludes non-building enclosures like boats or motor vehicles, guiding the dwelling limitation.
Maryland’s definition of “dwelling” has been read by Maryland courts as broader than the generic standard, notably through McKenzie and Scott-related reasoning.
The Fourth Circuit adopts a categorical approach, considering only the conviction’s elements and Maryland’s interpretation of “dwelling” to determine if the prior burglary fits the generic burglary definition.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Maryland first-degree burglary is generic burglary	Henriquez: Maryland’s dwelling definition is broader, risk of including boats/cars	Government: Maryland’s first-degree burglary fits generic burglary	No; Maryland’s dwelling scope risks non-generic conduct; vacate sentence

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (generic burglary definition; includes buildings/structures with intent to commit a crime)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits generic burglary to buildings/enclosed spaces; excludes boats/motor vehicles)
Bonilla v. United States, 687 F.3d 188 (2012) (applies Taylor-based generic burglary to Guidelines context)
Perez-Perez v. United States, 737 F.3d 950 (2013) (realistic probability Maryland would apply to non-generic conduct)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical approach; single-element conviction analysis)
Aparicio-Soria v. United States, 740 F.3d 152 (2014) (en banc; clarifies categorical approach for state offenses)