United States v. Jorge Vargas-Ruiz
20-5175
| 6th Cir. | Jul 13, 2021Background
- Vargas Ruiz was indicted for conspiracy to distribute ≥50g methamphetamine; exposure: 10 years to life.
- He entered a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea on June 11, 2019: government would request no more than 168 months, lowest-end fine, and 3-level acceptance credit; a sealed plea supplement said the government would “consider” a §5K1.1 motion for substantial assistance (discretionary).
- At the plea colloquy the district court discussed the supplement and stated it understood any §5K1.1 motion could be used “to go below the agreed upon [168-month] ceiling”; the parties (including Vargas Ruiz) agreed and the court accepted the plea but deferred final sentencing.
- Communication later broke down with counsel; at sentencing the government moved under §5K1.1 for a two-level reduction (not five), the court accepted the 168-month cap in the plea and sentenced Vargas Ruiz to 168 months.
- Vargas Ruiz appealed claiming his plea was not knowing/voluntary because he reasonably believed cooperation would produce a five-level reduction to yield the 120-month mandatory minimum; the Sixth Circuit held the plea involuntary, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Vargas Ruiz’s guilty plea (and appellate waiver) was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary | Vargas Ruiz contends he reasonably believed the §5K1.1 promise and court remarks guaranteed a departure large enough (five levels) to bring him to a 120‑month sentence | Government: plea text and plea supplement reserved sole prosecutorial discretion; Vargas Ruiz affirmed understanding at colloquy, so plea and waiver are enforceable | The court held the record (including the district court’s statements) created an objectively reasonable misunderstanding about the value of the §5K1.1 commitment; plea and waiver invalid; conviction and sentence vacated and remanded |
| Standard of review for plea-validity claim | Vargas Ruiz sought de novo review of the due‑process claim | Government argued for plain‑error review | Court applied de novo review because this is a due‑process claim about voluntariness (not a pure Rule 11 error) |
| Effect of prosecutorial discretion in §5K1.1 promise | Vargas Ruiz: despite discretion, court’s and government’s statements reasonably implied a substantial departure would be sought/used to go below 168 months | Government: discretionary 5K1.1 promise and plea language show no guarantee; any ambiguity is overcome by written agreement and Vargas Ruiz’s acknowledgments | Court: discretion did not defeat Vargas Ruiz’s reasonable misunderstanding given the colloquy; the government’s two‑level motion did not fulfill the understood promise, so plea was involuntary |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (plea must be knowing, voluntary, intelligent)
- United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) (plain‑error rule applies to Rule 11 errors; different treatment for due‑process voluntariness claims)
- United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1976) (assess objective reasonableness of defendant’s misunderstanding at plea)
- United States v. Catchings, 708 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2013) (de novo review for due‑process challenges to plea voluntariness)
- United States v. Ataya, 884 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2018) (appellate-waiver enforceability depends on whether plea was knowing and voluntary)
- United States v. Morrison, 852 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2017) (enforce appeal waivers when plea is knowing and voluntary)
- United States v. Saferstein, 673 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2012) (colloquy statements can create ambiguity in plea terms)
- United States v. Stampe, 994 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2021) (unfulfilled subjective expectations do not alone render a plea involuntary)