United States v. Rebecca StampeUnited States v. Rebecca Stampe
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee of Chattanooga. No. 1:18-cr-00016-1—Harry S. Mattice, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: January 27, 2021
Decided and Filed: April 20, 2021
Before: BOGGS, SUTTON, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Erin P. Rust, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Jay Woods, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY‘S OFFICE, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Erin P. Rust, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Jay Woods, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY‘S OFFICE, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. The government charged Rebecca Stampe and Michael Loden with conspiring to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine. Stampe pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government in its case against Loden. Loden did not plead guilty. Before Stampe‘s sentencing and Loden‘s trial, however, the government dropped Loden‘s case after “discover[ing] circumstances apart from evidence of . . . guilt which prevent[ed] . . . moving forward.” (R. 71, PageID 289.)
The government told Stampe that Loden‘s dismissal did not affect its case against her, even though they were co-conspirators, and the dismissal related to inappropriate conduct by a confidential informant. Unsatisfied with that answer, Stampe made two motions. First, she moved the district court to compel the government to disclose the information that led to the dismissal of her co-defendant‘s conspiracy charge or to review that evidence in camera. Second, she moved to withdraw from her plea agreement, which she says was premised in part on her ability to testify against Loden in exchange for a more lenient sentencing rеcommendation from the government.
Relying on government representations both that the informant‘s misconduct happened after Stampe‘s arrest and that the government had complied with disclosure obligations, the district court denied Stampe‘s motion for production or review. It also denied her motion to withdraw from her plea agreement. We AFFIRM.
I.
Relying on a warrant based on confidential-informant information, police searched Stampe‘s home and found drugs, scales, guns, and cash. Police arrested her, and she admitted to selling about 15 kilograms of methamphetamine that year. And she said that Michael Loden had been purchasing distribution quantities of methamphetamine from her for at least two months. The government used that information, on top of information providеd by a confidential informant in the two months after Stampe‘s arrest, to get a warrant to search Loden‘s house.
The government charged Stampe with possession with intent to distribute, and it charged Stampe and Loden with conspiring to distribute. Loden did not plead guilty, but Stampe entered a plea agreement under
Before Stampe‘s sentencing and shortly before Loden‘s trial, the United States moved to dismiss all charges against Loden. The motion stated that “during trial preparation, [the government had] discovered circumstances apart from evidence of [Loden‘s] guilt which prevent[ed] the United States from moving forward.” (R. 71, PageID 289.)
Stampe then moved to have the court compel production or review the materials in camera. Her motion explained that she had positioned herself for a downward departure for cooperating in Loden‘s case. And it explained that shе failed to see how information could lead to the entire dismissal of Loden‘s case but have no relevance in his co-defendant‘s case for the same conspiracy.
The government responded to the motion, claiming that the issues in Loden‘s case occurred while Stampe was in custody and so did not affect her case. And it noted that the plea agreement did not spеcifically require the government to seek a downward variance for cooperation in Loden‘s now-dismissed case.
At a hearing on the motion, the district court asked, “[i]s it the government‘s unequivocal representation to the Court that it has complied fully with all Brady obligations to Ms. Stampe?” (R. 92, PageID 341.) It also asked the same question about obligations under Giglio,
Given the court‘s decision, Stampe moved the court to “not accept her plea agreement” while “allow[ing] her to persist in her guilty plea.” (R. 98, PageID 373.) She wanted the court to reject the agreement because, as a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, it gave the judge no discretion to impose a lesser sentence based on her actual and intended cooperation in the Loden investigation and case. Because the government had said it would not request a downward variance in the wake of Loden‘s dismissal, Stampe argued she should be relieved from the plea agreement that prevented her from trying to get a lesser sentence based on her actual and intended cooperation in the Loden case. In response, the government construed her motion as a motion “to withdraw” from the plea agreement. (R. 105, PageID 396.) And it argued that the standards that govern guilty plea withdrawal under
II.
Stampe‘s principal argument on appeal is that the district court erred when it denied her motion for production or in camera review. We review that decision for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hernandez, 31 F.3d 354, 361 (6th Cir. 1994). Stampe‘s appeal implicates both constitutional and procedural standards about the showing required to trigger
“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case . . . .” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). But due process does protect defendants from government “suppression . . . of [material] evidence favorable to” them. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Evidence is matеrial “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Brady creates a freestanding government obligation to disclose material evidence. But it also contemplates that the government might sometimes withhold information either in good or bad faith. And that brings us to specific Brady requests fоr undisclosed materials—something one might call constitutional criminal discovery.
The Supreme Court has explained that a criminal defendant may be able to force disclosure or in camera review of some materials if he “establish[es] a basis,” “some plausible showing,” “for his claim that [something undisclosed] contains material evidence.” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 n.15 (1987) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)). This standard does not appear to require “a particularized showing of what information” is sought for the simple reason that before disclosure a defendant likely will not know the content of an undisclosed item—hence the request. Id. But the “plausible showing” standard remains a difficult hurdle; without knowing the content of a requested item, the defendant can likely provide little more than informed speculation as to materiality.
The Constitution is not the only option fоr criminal defendants though. They may also seek discovery under
Here, Stampe argued that the dismissal of Loden‘s identical conspiracy charge raised a red flag, and she requested that the court compel disclosure or review the undisclosed information itself in camera. The government‘s response? Timing and on-the-record statements of compliance.
The district court‘s first decision implicates the constitutional and procedural standards discussed above. It discounted Stampe‘s arguments as supported by no more than “pure speculatiоn“—a showing certainly below that required by Rule 16 and Ritchie. But it is not immediately clear that the district court‘s characterization was accurate. That Stampe‘s contention is speculative to a certain extent is, of course and unavoidably, true (if we knew the content, we would be spilling our ink elsewhere). But whether it was purely speculative is a closer question. This is not a case in which the defеndant fired blindly into the prosecution‘s papers alleging materiality. Her speculation was at least to a certain degree informed.
We need not dwell on this issue though. Even assuming Stampe said enough to trigger Rule 16 or Brady disclosure in the abstract, her arguments here ultimately fail because of the court‘s second move—relying on the government‘s representations. A defendant‘s ability to trigger forced disclosure or review under the Constitution or Rule 16 turns on her ability to make some type of showing that items sought might be material (what “materiality” means may depend on the rule at issue). But when the government in response shows that items sought are immaterial, it nips the defendant‘s request in the bud—disclosure or in camera review is unnecessary. And that is the case here.
In Hernandez, this court gave the government a powerful tool to avoid criminal discovery requests. 31 F.3d at 361. We held that because a “prosecuting attorney is an officer of the court,” a district “court is entitled to accept his representations” about whether a specifically requested item is material “absent some indication of misconduct.” Id. This is especially true in cases like this one in which the government both represents compliance with its disclosure obligations and backs up that assertion in some way. Cf. id. (noting that circumstances beyond the government‘s averments supported deference in relation to materiality). Here, the government‘s timing explanation made some sense. It is hard to think how misconduct in a related case after a criminal defendant has been arrested and admitted guilt might affect the government‘s case against that defendant—the cat was out of the bag, so Stampe and Loden were not similarly situated. And relying on the candidly limited information she had, Stampe did not help the district court walk through that tricky riddle. Under Hernandez, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stampe‘s motion.1
Alternatively, Stampe argues that the district court erred when it declined to let her withdraw from her plea agreement while persisting in her guilty plea. We review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ellis, 470 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 2006); Schuhe, 688 F. App‘x at 338.
Under
- the amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the motion to withdraw it;
- the presence (or absence) of a valid reason for the failure to move for withdrawal earlier in the prоceedings;
- whether the defendant has asserted or maintained his innocence;
- the circumstances underlying the entry of the guilty plea;
- the defendant‘s nature and background;
- the degree to which the defendant has had prior experience with the criminal justice system; and
- potential prejudice to the government if the motion to withdraw is granted.
Ellis, 470 F.3d at 281 (quoting United States v. Bashara, 27 F.3d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir. 1994)). And we often refer to these factors as the Bashara factors. Furthermore, while Rule 11 and some of these factors seem better suited for their intended inquiry than the inquiry here, we have applied these factors (albeit in an unpublished decision) when a defendant still desires to plead guilty and asks a court to “set aside [a] plea agreement.” See Schuhe, 688 F. App‘x at 338.
Before the district court, Stampe argued that
But Stampe did not provide the district court with any meaningful alternative to the Bashara factors and
Her Bashara argument boils down to one central claim: Loden‘s dismissal was a sеa change that undermined a central purpose of her agreement—the possibility that she might get a reduction if she cooperated in Loden‘s case. Without that possibility, she would not have agreed to the terms of the deal.
The problem with Stampe‘s argument is that it oversells the importance of that possibility based on the plea agreement itself. While we do not doubt that Stampe sincerely believed that she might avoid some prison time because of her putative cooperation in Loden‘s case, the plea agreement contemplated but did not require that possibility. So contrary to her assertion on appeal, it was not the “principal purpose” of the agreement. (Appellant Br. at 34.) The main purpose was the exchange of her рlea for the government dropping the other charge against her and agreeing to a 168-month sentence: “In consideration of the defendant‘s guilty plea, the United States agrees to move the Court at the time of sentencing to dismiss the remaining count against the defendant in the Superseding Indictment.” (R. 40, PageID 126.) The possibility of another reduction was a sweetener, not the main purpose. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion, especially because several factors that we have suggested apply in this context support its decision: the large gap of time separating her plea and her motion to withdraw; her undisputed guilt; her extensive background with the criminal justice system; and that she was not rushed into the agreement. The court did not abuse its discretion.
IV.
Our decisiоn leaves stones unturned—an unsatisfying result for Stampe who will be left puzzling about why the government so adamantly opposed her request if the undisclosed information was in fact immaterial to her case. This result highlights why it may be good prosecutorial policy to provide access to even immaterial evidence in some cases to promote perceptions of fairness. But we аre not in the business of policing prosecutorial policy. And the government may have had legitimate reasons for its decision beyond its materiality determination. Because the district court was entitled to rely on the government‘s representations and acted within its discretion in holding Stampe to her plea agreement, we AFFIRM.