United States v. Jorge Cisneros, 763 F.3d 1236

Background

Jorge Armando Cisneros pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); the government sought enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
The government relied on six prior Oregon convictions as ACCA predicates: three counts of fleeing/attempting to elude a police officer (Or. Rev. Stat. § 811.540(1)), two counts of first-degree burglary (Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.225), and one conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance.
Cisneros conceded the drug-conspiracy conviction qualified under Parry, so only two additional predicate convictions were required to trigger ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum.
The district court found all six priors qualified under ACCA’s residual clause and imposed the 180‑month sentence; Cisneros appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the prior convictions qualify as ACCA predicates and addressed (1) whether the Oregon fleeing statute is divisible (allowing examination of charging documents to identify vehicular flight) and (2) whether Oregon first-degree burglary qualifies under ACCA’s residual clause.

Issues

Issue	Cisneros' Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Oregon’s fleeing/attempting to elude statute (§ 811.540(1)) is divisible and whether Cisneros’s convictions were for vehicular flight (a violent felony under ACCA’s residual clause)	Descamps forbids looking at charging documents if a statute is indivisible; Snyder is outdated and should not control	The statute is divisible (vehicular vs. on-foot flight); charging documents show vehicular flight; Snyder remains controlling on vehicular flight as a violent felony	Statute is divisible; indictments show vehicular flight; all three convictions qualify as violent felonies under ACCA’s residual clause
Whether Oregon first-degree burglary (§ 164.225) is a violent felony under ACCA’s residual clause	Mayer’s ordinary‑case/residual‑clause analysis is wrong post-Descamps; Descamps undermines Mayer	Mayer remains binding in the Ninth Circuit and first-degree burglary in Oregon categorically poses serious risk of physical injury	Mayer remains good law; Oregon first-degree burglary qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA’s residual clause
Whether Descamps overruled Snyder and Mayer such that Ninth Circuit precedent must be abandoned	Descamps implicitly overruled Snyder and Mayer by limiting permissible fact review	Descamps did not undermine the reasoning of Snyder or Mayer; where statutes are divisible Snyder/Mayer can be reconciled with Descamps	Descamps did not overturn Snyder or Mayer; those precedents remain controlling to the extent reconcilable with Descamps
Constitutional vagueness challenge to ACCA’s residual clause	Residual clause is unconstitutionally vague	Residual clause valid for purposes of this case (relied on precedent)	Rejected vagueness challenge; applied residual clause as existing precedent allowed

Key Cases Cited

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limits sentencing-court use of documents to determine which alternative element supported a conviction when statute is indivisible)
United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 2011) (vehicular flight under Oregon’s fleeing statute is a violent felony under ACCA’s residual clause)
United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009) (Oregon first-degree burglary qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA’s residual clause)
United States v. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011) (vehicular flight prohibited by an Indiana statute qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA’s residual clause)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (under the modified categorical approach a court may consult limited documents such as charging papers and plea colloquies)
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (articulates ‘ordinary case’ analysis for ACCA residual‑clause inquiries)
United States v. Parry, 479 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2007) (held the relevant drug offense qualifies as an ACCA predicate)