United States v. Jones, 878 F.3d 10

Corey Jones resisted arrest while finishing a federal sentence at a residential reentry center and bit a U.S. Marshal, causing puncture wounds; he was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 111.
Probation classified Jones as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on two prior violent-felony convictions: New York first-degree robbery and second-degree assault, raising his Guidelines range to 210–240 months (statutory max 240 months).
The district court sentenced Jones to 180 months (15 years), below the Guidelines range; Jones appealed the career-offender designation and the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
After initial appellate briefing and a withdrawn panel decision, the Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States, holding the Guidelines’ residual clause not void-for-vagueness; the Second Circuit then asked supplemental briefing and reconsidered Jones’ challenge.
The panel held that New York first-degree robbery (including the least culpable variant: forcible stealing while armed with a deadly weapon) categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines’ residual clause, so Jones’ career-offender designation stands.
The court also upheld the 180-month sentence as substantively reasonable, emphasizing Jones’ extensive criminal history and in-prison misconduct and noting the sentence was a significant downward departure from the Guidelines range.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether NY first-degree robbery categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (residual clause)	Jones: robbery does not categorically qualify; earlier rulings and Johnson decisions cast doubt; his prior robbery was juvenile	Government: robbery (including forcible stealing while armed) presents serious potential risk of physical injury and is covered by the residual clause and commentary	Held: Yes. After Beckles, the residual clause is valid; NY first-degree robbery (least variant: armed forcible stealing) categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause.
Whether the 180-month sentence is substantively unreasonable	Jones: 15-year term is excessive given the passive nature of the assault (a bite) and lack of permanent injury	Government/District Court: sentence justified by need to respect law, protect officers, Jones’ extensive criminal history, career-offender status, and institutional misconduct; court granted a substantial downward variance from Guidelines	Held: Not substantively unreasonable. The 180-month sentence was a reasonable downward variance from the Guidelines range and affirmed.

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (analyzed scope of "use of force" in categorical approach)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (Sup. Ct. 2015) ("Johnson II": ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (held Guidelines’ residual clause not subject to vagueness challenge)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (explained categorical and modified categorical approaches)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (divisibility/methodology for applying modified categorical approach)
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (commentary to Guidelines given controlling weight unless invalid)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (description of "generic" crimes for ACCA/Guidelines analysis)
United States v. Walker, 595 F.3d 441 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussed robbery definition consensus and generic robbery)
United States v. Reyes, 691 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2012) (applied categorical approach to force-clause analysis)