United States v. Jones
700 F.3d 615
1st Cir.2012Background
- Agent received anonymous tip about drug activity at 31 Saugus Street, Portland, Maine, including a silver Toyota linked to the house.
- Corroboration efforts: records showed Maria Strong lived at the address and the Toyota belonged to Lemmie Nunes; past drug activity connected to the individuals and house.
- A drug-sniffing dog did not alert, but surveillance showed an African-American male leave the house, enter the Toyota, and drive away; the car was later stopped by multiple officers as a high-risk operation.
- Jones, seated in the front passenger seat, was detained with weapons drawn; he allegedly moved a hand toward his waist; he was forced from the car and restrained.
- A bag of cocaine base was found in Jones’s underwear during a visual search for weapons; Jones testified differently about the incident and their ability to breathe.
- Jones challenged suppression of the evidence and later challenged career-offender enhancements and the proof of prior conviction at sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop the Toyota | Jones | United States | Yes; stop supported by totality of circumstances. |
| Whether the stop escalated to a de facto arrest | Jones | United States | No; stop reasonable given safety concerns and number of officers. |
| Whether drugs were in plain view after stop | Jones | United States | Yes; district court credibility finding affirmed. |
| Whether ABPO is a crime of violence for career-offender status | Jones | United States | ABPO qualifies as crime of violence; properly counted. |
| Whether the 1997 drug conviction is too old to count as a career-offender predicate and the § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) enhancement proof beyond a reasonable doubt | Jones | United States | Yes counts; conviction within proper time frame; records sufficient beyond reasonable doubt. |
Key Cases Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996) (seizure on vehicle requires reasonable suspicion)
- Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (U.S. 1979) (stake of stop requires reasonable basis)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (reasonable suspicion standard; investigatory stop)
- Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (U.S. 2000) (anonymous tips require corroboration)
- United States v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (corroboration of anonymous informant; reliability balancing)
- United States v. Taylor, 162 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1998) (high-risk stop; multiple officers; safety concerns acknowledged)
- United States v. Chaney, 647 F.3d 401 (1st Cir. 2011) (officer safety factors do not alone negate Terry stop)
- United States v. Sumrall, 690 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2012) (crime of violence includes recklessness under 4B1.2)
- United States v. Bryant, 571 F.3d 147 (1st Cir. 2009) (statutory interpretation of career offender predicates)
- United States v. Dancy, 640 F.3d 455 (1st Cir. 2011) (Massachusetts ABPO elements and knowledge of victim status)