United States v. Jones
921 F.3d 932
10th Cir.2019Background
- Arnold Jones, a Laguna Pueblo member, pleaded guilty to child abuse for driving intoxicated on tribal land with his minor son; he had served one year in tribal custody and later pleaded guilty in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (state law incorporated).
- The district court announced an intent that would leave Jones with about nine months to serve but misstated calculations and imposed a 42‑month sentence (effectively 40 months after good‑time credit), twelve months longer than intended.
- The Probation Office’s PSR listed a maximum but no minimum; neither party objected to that omission at sentencing.
- The government concedes the district court miscalculated but argues the error is harmless because New Mexico law allegedly imposes a six‑year mandatory minimum for the offense, citing United States v. Wood.
- Jones contends New Mexico imposes no mandatory minimum for his conviction because New Mexico sentencing permits suspension, deferment, or reduction; the Tenth Circuit agreed and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court’s mathematical sentencing error requires vacatur and resentencing | Jones: error changed the term actually imposed; must be vacated and remanded | Govt: error is harmless because New Mexico imposes a six‑year mandatory minimum, so sentence remains below mandatory minimum | Vacated and remanded — error not harmless; resentencing required |
| Whether a state "mandatory minimum" under the IMCA/ACA includes state schemes that allow suspension or deferment | Jones: New Mexico’s scheme allows suspension/deferment so no binding minimum exists | Govt: Wood requires incorporation of state minimums (six years) despite suspension provisions | Held: under New Mexico law there is no fixed mandatory minimum for this offense because the legislature did not forbid suspension/deferment; therefore no six‑year minimum to incorporate |
| Whether Wood controls to force a federal court to impose a state‑defined minimum when state law contains suspension/deferment authority | Govt: Wood forbids federal courts from applying state suspension to avoid a state mandatory minimum | Jones: Wood is distinguishable because Oklahoma law in Wood had an express non‑suspendable minimum | Held: Wood does not mandate a six‑year minimum here; it applies where the state statute itself establishes a non‑suspendable minimum |
| Whether U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) requires imposing a state minimum here | Govt: §5G1.1(b) would convert state minimum into the guideline sentence | Jones: no state minimum exists to trigger §5G1.1(b) | Held: §5G1.1(b) inapplicable because New Mexico established no statutory minimum that cannot be suspended or deferred |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Wood, 386 F.3d 961 (10th Cir. 2004) (held that where state law prescribes a non‑suspendable statutory minimum, federal court must respect that minimum under IMCA/Guidelines)
- United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1989) (ACA incorporates state maximum and minimum terms; Guidelines apply within those bounds)
- United States v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1990) (applied Garcia to IMCA, limiting incorporation to state minimums and maximums)
- United States v. Pluff, 253 F.3d 490 (9th Cir. 2001) (IMCA incorporation may include elements and sentencing scheme; post‑1990 amendments changed analysis)
- Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155 (1998) (discusses ACA’s gap‑filling role in federal enclaves)
- State v. Martinez, 966 P.2d 747 (N.M. 1998) (New Mexico defines a mandatory minimum as the portion of a sentence the legislature has indicated cannot be suspended or deferred; distinguishes non‑suspendable statutes)