United States v. Jones, 541 F.Supp.3d 325

Background

Jones was indicted on terrorism and related weapons counts; he pled guilty (Sept. 8, 2017) to a superseding information charging conspiracy to provide material support to Al Shabaab (Count One), conspiracy to receive military training from Al Shabaab (Count Two), and a § 924(c) weapons count (Count Three).
The plea agreement contained an explicit waiver preserving the Government’s ability to commence or reinstate any prosecution that was not time-barred on the plea date if a conviction under the agreement were later vacated.
At sentencing the Court imposed an aggregate 35-year term and, at the Government’s request, dismissed the counts in the original indictment.
On appeal Jones challenged only the § 924(c) conviction (Count Three); the Second Circuit vacated that conviction in light of United States v. Davis and remanded for resentencing on Counts One and Two, denying the Government’s broader request for reinstatement of dismissed charges.
The Government then moved in the district court to reinstate the original indictment (or in the alternative to obtain a superseding indictment); the district court denied reinstatement, invoking the appellate mandate and related precedent, but held the plea agreement would permit the Government to seek a superseding indictment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court may reinstate the original indictment after the Second Circuit remanded for resentencing	The Government: reinstatement motion was not addressed by the appellate mandate and may be considered now	Jones: the mandate limited the remand to resentencing; reinstatement was foreclosed	Denied reinstatement — the mandate foreclosed relitigation because the Government had asked the Second Circuit for reinstatement and the court issued a narrower remand (mandate rule)
Whether the plea agreement permits the Government to reinstate or re‑bring dismissed charges (and waives statute-of-limitations defenses)	The Government: plea agreement expressly allows commencement or reinstatement of any prosecution not time-barred on the plea date	Jones: argued he did not repudiate the plea bargain but did not (successfully) claim the agreement barred reinstatement	Held: plea agreement language contemplates reinstatement and tolling; it does not bar a superseding indictment and waives SOL defenses for timely charges
Whether Minicone’s rule (issues not raised on appeal may be considered on remand) allows consideration of reinstatement now	Government: Minicone permits the district court to decide matters not part of the appellate decision	Jones: Government did raise reinstatement on appeal, so Minicone does not apply	Held: Minicone inapplicable here because the Government had sought reinstatement on appeal, so the appellate court’s limited mandate governs
Whether double jeopardy, statute of limitations, or frustration-of-purpose arguments bar reinstatement	Government: these defenses do not block reinstatement; frustration-of-purpose allegedly discharges obligations	Jones: not fully litigated in opinion	Held: Court did not resolve these defenses because the mandate rule resolved the motion; thus they were not addressed on the merits

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001) (mandate rule bars relitigation of issues decided or foregone on appeal)
United States v. Minicone, 994 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1993) (district court may consider matters not part of the appellate decision)
United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacatur of convictions typically requires de novo resentencing because the sentencing "constellation" changes)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidating certain applications of the residual clause of § 924(c))
United States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (plea agreements interpreted under ordinary contract principles with ambiguities construed against the Government)
United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551 (2d Cir. 1996) (plea agreement interpretation principles)