United States v. Jonathon Lamb
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1933
8th Cir.2017Background
- Defendant Jonathon Lamb pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to the ACCA mandatory minimum (180 months) based on three prior violent-felony convictions.
- Two prior Michigan unarmed robbery convictions were previously held to qualify under the ACCA force clause; that portion of the court’s prior decision is reinstated.
- The remaining contested predicate was a 2006 Wisconsin burglary conviction under Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m)(a) ("building or dwelling").
- The legal question centers on whether Wisconsin’s burglary statute is divisible and whether Lamb’s conviction was for the generic burglary offense recognized by Taylor.
- The Supreme Court’s decision in Mathis (addressing divisibility/means vs. elements) required the court to reanalyze the Wisconsin burglary conviction under the modified categorical / categorical framework.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Lamb) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Do Lamb’s Michigan robbery convictions qualify as ACCA violent felonies under the force clause? | Government: Yes; prior analysis applying the categorical approach was correct. | Lamb: Challenged via certiorari remand. | Court: Reinstated prior holding — Michigan robberies are ACCA violent felonies. |
| 2. Is Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1m) (subsections (a)–(f)) divisible for ACCA purposes? | Government: Yes; subsections list alternative locational elements, so statute is divisible. | Lamb: Did not contest divisibility of (a)–(f); focused on subsection (a). | Court: Subsections (a)–(f) are divisible; modified categorical approach may be used to identify the subsection of conviction. |
| 3. Is subsection (a) ("building or dwelling") itself divisible or indivisible under Mathis? | Government: Even if subsection (a) is indivisible, the statutory meaning supports generic burglary. | Lamb: Argues subsection (a) is indivisible and overbroad (could cover non-generic places). | Court: Assumed, without deciding, that subsection (a) might be indivisible (per Seventh Circuit) but proceeded and concluded it nonetheless corresponds to generic burglary. |
| 4. Does a conviction under § 943.10(1m)(a) categorically match Taylor’s generic burglary (building/structure + intent)? | Government: Yes; (a) covers buildings/dwellings that are structures and match generic burglary. | Lamb: "Dwelling" could include non-structural curtilage or vehicles, making it overinclusive and not generic. | Court: Rejected Lamb’s speculation as unrealistic; statutory context and Wisconsin definitions show "dwelling" is a subset of structures; conviction is for generic burglary. |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (distinguishes categorical and modified categorical approaches and limits use of conviction records)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (clarifies elements vs. means and how to determine divisibility)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (defines "generic burglary" elements)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (categorical approach precedent referenced)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (requires realistic probability, not hypothetical possibility, to show state statute covers non-generic conduct)