United States v. Jonathan Vanderhorst, 18-4717

Jonathan Vanderhorst pleaded guilty (conditionally) to Hobbs Act conspiracy and robbery, discharge of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (§924(c)), and felon-in-possession; preserved appeal of denial of motion to dismiss Count 5; sentenced to 660 months.
Vanderhorst argued Count 5 was invalid because the §924(c) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, Hobbs Act robbery cannot qualify under the force clause, and Hobbs Act robbery/extortion are indivisible.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss and imposed sentence without expressly addressing several nonfrivolous mitigation arguments (childhood trauma, cognitive/emotional limitations, delayed brain development associated with youth, and sentencing disparities with codefendants).
On appeal the court held that, although the §924(c) residual clause is void, binding precedent (Mathis) establishes Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause and the Hobbs Act is divisible; therefore the §924(c) conviction was affirmed.
The appellate court found procedural error in sentencing because the district court failed to adequately address or explain its rejection of Vanderhorst’s nonfrivolous mitigation arguments and could not say the error was harmless; the sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of §924(c) conviction (Count 5)	§924(c) residual clause is void; Hobbs Act robbery cannot qualify under force clause	Residual clause void but Hobbs Act robbery still qualifies under force clause per precedent	Conviction affirmed: residual clause void but Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under force clause
Divisibility of Hobbs Act (robbery vs. extortion)	Hobbs Act robbery and extortion are indivisible	Hobbs Act lists alternative elements and is divisible	Hobbs Act is divisible for modified categorical approach
Procedural reasonableness of sentence	District court failed to give individualized explanation addressing nonfrivolous mitigation (trauma, youth, brain development, cognitive limits, disparity)	Any explanatory deficiency was harmless	Sentence vacated and remanded: court committed procedural error by inadequately explaining rejection of mitigation and error not harmless
Substantive reasonableness of 660‑month sentence	Sentence substantively excessive	Sentence reasonable given facts	Not reached on appeal due to procedural error; left for district court on remand

United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (Supreme Court: §924(c) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague)
United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2019) (Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause; Hobbs Act is divisible)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishing alternative elements from alternative means for divisibility analysis)
United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513 (4th Cir. 2017) (adequacy of sentencing explanation requires individualized analysis and response to mitigation)
United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2020) (district court need address defendant’s central mitigation thesis, not every detail)
United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740 (4th Cir. 2019) (appellate court may not guess at district court’s rationale)
United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 2020) (court need not address every argument but must consider nonfrivolous ones)
United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832 (4th Cir. 2010) (harmlessness standard for procedural sentencing errors)
United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2020) (requirement of individualized assessment and adequate explanation at sentencing)