93 F.4th 605
2d Cir.2024Background
- Cory Johnson was initially investigated in 2018 for trading child sexual abuse material (CSAM) online; a search of his home resulted in seizure of electronic devices containing thousands of CSAM files.
- He was first indicted for distribution, but a plea agreement resulted in a conviction only for possession of child pornography and a 45-month sentence.
- After sentencing, a later review of previously seized and segregated digital evidence led to the discovery of a video showing Johnson sexually abusing his minor daughter and producing CSAM.
- Following this discovery, Johnson was indicted for production of child pornography and sentenced to 240 months in prison.
- Johnson filed motions to suppress the new evidence as a Fourth Amendment violation and to dismiss the new indictment, arguing it was precluded by the earlier plea agreement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4th Amendment: Review of segregated evidence | NCMEC’s post-conviction review of metadata exceeded the scope and timing authorized by 2018 warrant; was a new search | Gov’t: Review only involved already-segregated, responsive contraband; no new search and reasonable under the warrant | No 4th Amendment violation—review was of lawfully seized, responsive data within warrant scope |
| Plea Agreement: Bar on subsequent prosecution | Second indictment was precluded by plea agreement barring charges for any known offense relative to CSAM possession/distrib | Gov’t: Production offense not known at time of plea; agreement does not cover future-discovered or production offenses | No bar—production charge not covered by plea agreement, and gov’t lacked knowledge at time of original plea |
| Scope of Search Warrant (metadata) | Warrant did not specifically mention GPS/metadata, so review exceeded scope | Gov’t: Warrant’s language broad and covers metadata/GPS as contextual information for CSAM court sought | GPS and metadata were within scope of sufficiently particular digital search warrant |
| Timeliness of Forensic Review | 2019 review untimely, as too distant from 2018 seizure and after prosecution/sentencing | Gov’t: No unreasonable delay; interest in ongoing investigation and victim identification superseded time concerns | Review within reasonable time; delay did not render examination constitutionally infirm |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ganias, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016) (discussing limits on reexamination of lawfully seized digital data)
- United States v. Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 2019) (addressing standards for digital searches and subsequent reviews)
- United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017), abrogated on other grounds by Carpenter v. United States (warrant specificity in digital searches)
- Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant if the action is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment)
- Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (motivation for seizure irrelevant if search is lawfully confined by warrant)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (objective reasonableness controls Fourth Amendment analysis)
- United States v. Purcell, 967 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2020) (approving broad search warrants when supported by probable cause)
- United States v. Miller, 430 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2005) (touchstone of Fourth Amendment is reasonableness)
- United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (standard for reviewing plea agreements)
- United States v. Riera, 298 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2002) (interpretation of plea agreements per contract principles)
- United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999) (plea agreements strictly construed against the government)
