United States v. John Tomes, Jr.
990 F.3d 500
| 6th Cir. | 2021Background:
- John Tomes Jr. pleaded guilty to federal drug, firearm, and money‑laundering offenses and was sentenced in 2018 to 20 years’ imprisonment.
- He filed a pro se compassionate‑release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing chronic asthma and COVID‑19 risk and arguing his sentence would be shorter under post‑sentencing changes to law.
- The district court denied relief after ordering briefing, reasoned that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 limited “extraordinary and compelling” reasons and found Tomes had not shown severe medical evidence, BOP inability to treat COVID‑19, or other qualifying reasons.
- The district court also expressly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and concluded they weighed against release given Tomes’s armed, large‑scale drug distribution and money‑laundering conduct.
- On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion, addressed whether § 1B1.13 limits inmate‑filed motions, evaluated the § 3553(a) balancing, and rejected Tomes’s argument that the First Step Act’s § 401 applies retroactively to his sentence.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 limits what counts as “extraordinary and compelling” for defendant‑filed compassionate‑release motions | Tomes argued the court should consider § 1B1.13 categories to deny or guide relief | Government/district court relied on § 1B1.13 to limit qualifying reasons | Court: § 1B1.13 is not an applicable, binding policy statement for inmate‑filed motions; district courts need not be bound by it |
| Whether Tomes’s chronic asthma/COVID‑19 risk constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason | Tomes claimed asthma increases COVID risk warranting release | Government argued Tomes provided no medical records and BOP measures suffice | Held: Tomes failed to show persuasive medical evidence; court could deny on that basis |
| Whether the § 3553(a) factors independently justify denial of compassionate release | Tomes argued rehabilitation, family support, and sentencing disparities favor release | Government argued § 3553(a) factors (seriousness, deterrence, public protection) weigh against release given offense gravity and dangerousness | Held: District court permissibly weighed § 3553(a) factors and denial was not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether First Step Act § 401’s change to § 841(b)(1)(A) entitles Tomes to a reduced sentence via § 3582(c)(1)(A) | Tomes argued he would face a shorter mandatory minimum today because his prior convictions are not "serious drug felonies" | Government argued § 401 is not retroactive to sentences already imposed before the Act’s enactment | Held: § 401 is not retroactive to Tomes’s sentence; § 3582(c)(1)(A) is not a vehicle to circumvent that bar |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020) (abuse‑of‑discretion review; § 3553(a) balancing can independently justify denial)
- United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020) (explains § 3582(c)(1)(A) three‑step framework and First Step Act implications)
- United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2021) (holds § 1B1.13 is not an applicable policy statement for inmate‑filed motions)
- United States v. Wiseman, 932 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act § 401 not retroactive to sentences imposed before enactment)
- Chavez‑Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018) (clarifies required sufficiency of district court’s explanation for sentencing decisions)