United States v. Joaquin Amador Serrapio, Jr., 754 F.3d 1312

Background

In 2012 Joaquin Serrapio, Jr. posted threats to shoot President Obama on Facebook, pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 871, and was sentenced to three years probation with four months home confinement (electronic monitoring) and 250 hours community service; no direct appeal of that sentence was taken.
After sentencing Serrapio gave press interviews quoting him as calling the episode “pretty funny,” downplaying the home confinement, and noting publicity benefits to his band.
The district court held a post-sentencing hearing (not a probation-revocation proceeding) and, finding Serrapio’s post-sentencing conduct relevant, modified probation conditions to add 45 days in a halfway house and extend home confinement with electronic monitoring to one year.
Serrapio completed the modified terms without a stay and appealed, arguing violations of the Double Jeopardy Clause, Due Process, and the First Amendment.
The Eleventh Circuit held the challenge to the 45-day halfway-house term moot but concluded the appeal as to the additional home-confinement (and related monitoring costs) was live because Serrapio had to pay electronic monitoring costs that could theoretically be refunded.
On the merits the court held § 3563(c) authorized the modification, Double Jeopardy was not violated, any procedural defects did not establish plain error, and using Serrapio’s statements to justify stricter conditions did not breach the First Amendment.

Issues

Issue	Serrapio's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Double Jeopardy: Did modifying probation conditions (longer home confinement) after sentence violate Double Jeopardy?	Modification punished Serrapio again for the same offense and upset his legitimate expectation in the original sentence.	§ 3563(c) expressly permits modification; changes were authorized and based on post-sentencing conduct, so no successive criminal punishment.	No Double Jeopardy violation — modification permissible under § 3563(c) and did not frustrate a protected expectation of finality.
Mootness: Is appeal moot because modified terms were served?	Entire appeal moot because Serrapio completed the modified conditions.	Not moot as to home-confinement costs — a financial collateral consequence remains.	Partially moot: 45-day halfway-house claim dismissed as moot; home-confinement claim not moot due to monitoring costs.
Due Process / Procedure: Did the court violate Rule 32.1(b) protections by not using revocation procedures or full revocation safeguards?	Serrapio contends Rule 32.1(c) modification hearing lacks revocation safeguards and denied required process.	Parties had notice; defendant and counsel had opportunity to respond; any defect did not produce plain error affecting substantial rights.	No plain error: process was adequate under Rule 32.1(c) and, even if error existed, it did not plainly affect fairness.
First Amendment: Did using Serrapio’s post-sentencing statements to increase confinement punish protected speech?	Court punished Serrapio for exercising speech in interviews, chilling free expression.	Statements were relevant evidence about lack of remorse/understanding and sentencing conditions may consider relevant speech; First Amendment doesn’t bar consideration of relevant post-sentencing conduct.	No First Amendment violation: statements were relevant to sentencing considerations (seriousness, deterrence, respect for law) and defendant wasn’t penalized for mere abstract beliefs.

Key Cases Cited

Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (Double Jeopardy protects against successive criminal punishments, not all burdens called punishment)
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (Double Jeopardy does not always bar post-judgment sentence modification; defendant expectations and legislative intent govern)
Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201 (Probation revocation and confinement for violations generally not a Double Jeopardy concern)
Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (courts have broad discretion to revoke or modify probation conditions in the interests of justice)
Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (First Amendment does not categorically bar admission of beliefs/associations at sentencing where relevant)
Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264 (probation modification authority and purpose)
United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d 632 (11th Cir.) (legitimate expectations in sentence finality relevant to Double Jeopardy analysis)
United States v. Thurston, 362 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir.) (standard of review for Double Jeopardy challenges to sentencing actions)