United States v. Jimmy David Malone
889 F.3d 310
6th Cir.2018Background
- Malone was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm and for witness intimidation; he pleaded guilty to both counts.
- The Presentence Report classified Malone as an Armed Career Criminal (ACCA) based on three prior convictions: Tennessee aggravated assault, federal drug trafficking, and Kentucky second-degree burglary.
- Malone challenged only the classification of his Kentucky second-degree burglary conviction as an ACCA predicate, arguing the Kentucky statute is broader than the ACCA’s definition of generic burglary.
- Kentucky’s second-degree burglary statute criminalizes knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in a “dwelling” with intent to commit a crime; Kentucky’s definitional section separately defines “building,” “dwelling,” and “premises.”
- The district court rejected Malone’s argument and imposed the ACCA 15-year mandatory minimum; the Sixth Circuit reviews de novo and affirms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kentucky second-degree burglary is categorically equivalent to generic burglary for ACCA purposes | Malone: Kentucky’s statutory language (via the definition of “building”) covers vehicles/movable structures, making § 511.030 broader than generic burglary | Government: “Dwelling” in § 511.030 uses the ordinary meaning of “building,” not the statute’s expanded definitional meaning, so the statute matches generic burglary | The statute’s definitions show “dwelling” refers to the ordinary meaning of “building,” so Kentucky second-degree burglary categorically matches generic burglary; ACCA enhancement affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (categorical approach requires comparing statutory elements to generic offense)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (definition of generic burglary: unlawful entry or remaining in a building or structure with intent to commit a crime)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (limitations on comparing statute elements to generic offense; focus on elements, not facts)
- TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (statutory interpretation: avoid readings that render text superfluous)
- Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (disparate inclusion or exclusion of language in statutes is presumed intentional)
- Sanders v. Allison Engine Co., Inc., 703 F.3d 930 (statutory definitions do not uniformly carry the same meaning across a statute)
- United States v. Johnson, 707 F.3d 655 (standard of review and ACCA categorical analysis in Sixth Circuit)