United States v. Jimenez, 895 F.3d 228

Background

Jimenez, a former Marine dishonorably discharged after court-martial convictions for trafficking stolen military property and drug offenses, was arrested with a 9mm round on his person after an undercover firearms transaction.
He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(6) for possession of ammunition by a person discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; he pled guilty while preserving his right to appeal the statute's constitutionality.
The district court denied his motion to dismiss challenging § 922(g)(6) under the Second Amendment; Jimenez appealed the denial.
The Second Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the Second Amendment could apply to Jimenez and analyzed the statute under the court’s two-step Second Amendment framework.
The court treated Jimenez as outside the Amendment’s core (because he was convicted of felony-equivalent conduct by court-martial) but found the statute imposes a substantial burden and therefore applied intermediate scrutiny.
The court upheld § 922(g)(6) as substantially related to the government’s important interest in public safety, affirming the district court judgment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 922(g)(6) violates the Second Amendment as applied to Jimenez	Jimenez argued the ban on ammunition possession by dishonorably discharged veterans invalidly burdens core Second Amendment rights (self-defense in the home) and lacked empirical support	Government argued dishonorable discharge for felony-equivalent conduct removes claimant from the Amendment’s core; Congress reasonably applied felon-type disabilities to dangerous groups and may ban ammunition possession	Court held: Assumed Second Amendment protection but applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld § 922(g)(6) as constitutional as applied to Jimenez
Whether a conviction by court-martial undermines Congress’s reliance on military discharge to impose firearm/ammunition disabilities	Jimenez contended military tribunals' lesser procedural protections make reliance unreasonable	Government argued court-martial convictions and dishonorable discharges are constitutionally valid and comparable to civilian felony findings for these purposes	Court held: Military convictions and dishonorable discharges are adequate bases for Congress to restrict arms possession
Whether prohibition on ammunition (versus firearms) is less justified	Jimenez argued bullets are categorically less dangerous than guns	Government argued ammunition is integral to a gun’s lethality; banning bullets serves same safety interest	Court held: Ban on ammunition possession is as justified as firearms ban for persons disqualified under § 922(g)(6)
Whether this is a facial challenge to § 922(g)(6)	Jimenez presented a facial challenge	Court explained that because the statute constitutionally applies to him, he lacks standing to press a broader facial challenge to other applications	Court held: This was an as-applied challenge in effect; it did not reach questions about other categories of discharge

Key Cases Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (establishes individual right to possess firearms for self-defense and recognizes longstanding prohibitions as presumptively lawful)
United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012) (requirement to analyze the defendant's conduct before hypothetical applications; facial challenge limits)
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018) (Second Circuit two-step framework; intermediate scrutiny guidance)
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015) (articulation of stepwise analysis and scrutiny factors)
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (core-right identification; law-abiding and responsible qualifier)
United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding federal ban on ex-felons' access to firearms)
United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387 (2013) (Congress may rely on court-martial convictions to impose civil disabilities)