United States v. Jim Thornhill
940 F.3d 1114
| 9th Cir. | 2019Background
- FBI traced a graphic voicemail reporting sexual abuse of a 10‑year‑old to a Juneau cannery; co‑workers identified the voice as Jim Thornhill and found a Nokia phone and handwritten lists of explicit search terms at his desk.
- Forensic analysis of the Nokia phone showed over 100 child‑pornography images received and stored between November 3 and December 25, 2014.
- Thornhill was indicted for receipt of child pornography (18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), (b)(1)); the government sought to admit Thornhill’s 2008 Alaska conviction for sexual abuse of his 11‑year‑old daughter under Fed. R. Evid. 414.
- The parties stipulated to several facts (including Thornhill’s ownership of the phone and authorship of the lists), which reduced the government’s witness list; the district court admitted the prior conviction after applying the LeMay factors and gave a limiting instruction.
- Thornhill was convicted by a jury and sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment; he appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion admitting the prior conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility under Rule 414 (prior child‑molestation conviction) | United States: Rule 414 applies; prior conviction is "child molestation" and is relevant to sexual interest and knowledge. | Thornhill: prior contact offense is dissimilar to non‑contact receipt of images; probative value weak. | Admissible under Rule 414; similarity (victim age/gender and incestuous search terms) supported relevance. |
| Rule 403 balancing — unfair prejudice vs probative value | United States: prior conviction probative of intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, and identity of downloader. | Thornhill: evidence was highly prejudicial (incest) and unnecessary given stipulations. | Probative value not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; district court did not abuse discretion. |
| Timing of admissibility ruling under LeMay (must await testimony) | United States: court may rule pretrial based on stipulations and the record; LeMay factors are guidance, not a rigid timing rule. | Thornhill: LeMay requires considering "testimonies already offered at trial" before ruling (timing requirement). | Majority: no rigid timing requirement; pretrial ruling was permissible here given stipulations and limited evidence (concurrence disagreed but found any error harmless). |
| Necessity under LeMay factor five (need beyond testimony) | United States: prior conviction was helpful/practically necessary to rebut defense that someone else downloaded images and to show intent. | Thornhill: stipulations (phone ownership, lists) negated need for prior conviction evidence. | District court reasonably found the prior conviction helpful/practically necessary; factor favored admission. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2001) (articulates five‑factor test for admitting prior child‑molestation evidence under Rules 413–414 and Rule 403 balancing)
- Curtin v. United States, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (discusses prejudice of highly inflammatory sexual‑content evidence and need to review full content before admission)
- Doe ex rel. Rudy‑Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000) (addresses admissibility and balancing of prior sexual‑misconduct evidence)
- United States v. Spoor, 904 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2018) (upheld admission of prior sexual‑abuse conviction in child‑pornography prosecution where victim ages were similar)
- United States v. Emmert, 825 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2016) (admission of prior sexual abuse upheld where prior victims were similar in age and acts resembled images)
- United States v. Preston, 873 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversed admission where link between fantasy act and charged conduct was too tenuous)
- United States v. Woods, 684 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 2012) (prior molestation probative of interest in child pornography and attribution of files to defendant)
- United States v. Pineda‑Doval, 614 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard for abuse of discretion review of evidentiary rulings)
- Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000) (limine rulings are not absolute; trial judge may revisit evidentiary rulings)
- Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000) (jury presumed to follow limiting instructions)