890 F.3d 697
8th Cir.2018Background
- Defendants Jesse Benton (campaign chair), John Tate (campaign manager), and Dimitrios Kesari (deputy campaign manager) worked for Ron Paul’s 2012 campaign and sought Iowa State Sen. Kent Sorenson’s endorsement. Kesari arranged and delivered a $25,000 check to Sorenson’s wife and later orchestrated payments routed through a vendor (ICT) to conceal payments for Sorenson’s endorsement.
- Campaign staff invoiced and coded the payments to ICT as “audio/visual expenses” and reported those disbursements to the Federal Election Commission (FEC).
- After press inquiries alleging the campaign paid Sorenson, campaign officers (including Benton and Tate) publicly denied payment and delayed/wiped an approved $25,000 wire to avoid the payment appearing on the quarterly FEC filing.
- Defendants were indicted on conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), causing false records (18 U.S.C. § 1519), causing false campaign expenditure reports (FECA), and a false statements scheme (18 U.S.C. § 1001). After a retrial, the jury convicted Benton, Tate, and Kesari on Counts charging false reports, false statements, and conspiracy; Kesari was convicted on the § 1519 count as charged in the superseding indictment.
- The defendants appealed, challenging sufficiency of the evidence, statutory construction (including application of § 1519), jury instructions, evidentiary rulings (expert exclusion and admission of the $25,000 check/email), severance, multiplicity, and alleged discovery/Brady/Jencks/Giglio violations. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FECA reporting provisions criminally prohibit reporting payments to an intermediary vendor while concealing the true payee/purpose | Gov’t: Combination of a conduit payee plus false purpose (reporting as audio/visual) can support FECA and related criminal charges | Defendants: It is lawful to pay a vendor who pays sub-vendors and to report only the vendor; reports were not false because ICT provided some services | Held: Court affirmed—evidence showed payments were in truth for Sorenson’s endorsement and were knowingly mischaracterized, supporting FECA and related convictions |
| Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (causing false records) to false campaign expenditure reports | Gov’t: False financial records used to conceal payments fall within § 1519’s protection of records used to preserve information | Defendants: § 1519 was meant for financial-market fraud and should not apply to campaign reports; would render FECA redundant | Held: § 1519 applies; false campaign financial records qualify as “tangible object[s] used to record or preserve information,” and invoking § 1519 here does not improperly broaden the statute |
| Materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for false statements in FEC filings | Gov’t: False purpose statements were capable of influencing the FEC and public reporting process | Defendants: FEC posts filings automatically; false descriptions did not materially influence Commission action | Held: Materiality satisfied—false descriptions had a natural tendency/capability to influence the Commission’s functions even if the filings were posted anyway |
| Severance motion to allow Kesari to testify for Tate (Bruton/impeachment/exculpation) | Tate: Kesari would provide substantially exculpatory testimony that Tate was not told of payments or promises | Gov’t: Kesari’s proffered testimony was equivocal and impeachable by emails and prior statements | Held: Denial affirmed—co-defendant’s proposed testimony was contradicted by documentary record and impeachment evidence; joint trial proper |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mack, 343 F.3d 929 (8th Cir.) (standard of review for statutory construction and sufficiency)
- United States v. Boesen, 491 F.3d 852 (8th Cir.) (standard for judgment of acquittal review)
- United States v. Rowland, 826 F.3d 100 (2d Cir.) (upholding convictions under FECA and § 1519 in similar context)
- Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (§ 1519 covers tangible objects used to record or preserve information)
- United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475 (1984) (meaning of “matter within the jurisdiction” of an agency)
- United States v. Wintermute, 443 F.3d 993 (8th Cir.) (materiality requires capability to influence)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (multiplicity/Blockburger test)
- Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998) (willfulness jury instruction guidance)