United States v. Jerramey Roper, 72 F.4th 1097

In 2013 Roper pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense; the district court applied the Sentencing Guidelines' career-offender enhancement and sentenced him to 204 months.
The career-offender enhancement depended on several Washington state prior convictions that the court treated as qualifying predicate felonies under U.S.S.G. §4B1.1.
Subsequent decisional developments (United States v. Valencia-Mendoza and State v. Blake) eliminated three of Roper's predicate convictions; if sentenced today he would not be a career offender and his Guidelines range would be lower.
Roper moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing intervening changes in sentencing law were an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence.
The district court denied the motion, believing it was categorically barred from considering non-retroactive changes in sentencing law; the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding district courts may consider such decisional changes when assessing extraordinary and compelling reasons.

Issue	Roper's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
May district courts consider non-retroactive changes in decisional law affecting the applicable Guidelines when evaluating "extraordinary and compelling reasons" under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i)?	Yes — courts may consider intervening decisional changes (with other individualized factors) to support a reduction.	No — allowing this would impermissibly relitigate or evade sentencing determinations.	Yes — Ninth Circuit holds courts may consider such decisional changes; remanded for reassessment.
Does considering decisional changes for compassionate release improperly circumvent habeas or plea-waiver/ collateral-attack rules?	No — §3582 motions are discretionary and distinct from habeas; relief does not imply original sentence was unlawful.	Yes — it could allow an end-run around habeas-channeling and plea waivers.	No — court rejects categorical habeas bar; distinguishing discretionary leniency from collateral attack.
Should courts create a categorical prohibition against considering decisional law when Congress has not explicitly barred it?	Courts should not create a categorical bar where Congress did not.	Government urges restraint/limits based on statutory framework and Commission statements.	Court declines to create a categorical bar and follows Concepcion's principle favoring sentencing discretion.

Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022) (Supreme Court: district courts may consider intervening changes of law/fact when exercising sentence-modification discretion; limits are statutory or constitutional).
United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092 (9th Cir. 2022) (Ninth Circuit: district courts may consider nonretroactive statutory sentencing changes as part of extraordinary and compelling analysis).
United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2021) (standard of review: denial of §3582(c)(1)(A) relief reviewed for abuse of discretion).
United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) (Second Circuit: district courts may consider nonretroactive Guidelines amendments in compassionate-release decisions).
United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048 (6th Cir. 2022) (Sixth Circuit en banc: decisional-law changes cannot serve as extraordinary and compelling reasons).
United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019) (interpreting Washington sentencing scheme for career-offender predicate analysis).
State v. Blake, 481 P.3d 521 (Wash. 2021) (Washington Supreme Court: invalidated the state statute under which some possession convictions were obtained).