United States v. Jerome Wilson
880 F.3d 80
3rd Cir.2018Background
- Jerome Wilson pled guilty to three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) for unarmed bank robbery or attempted robbery by demand note; one note stated, “this is a hold up... or else.”
- Presentence Report treated § 2113(a) convictions as "crimes of violence," recommending career-offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which raised his offense level and criminal-history category.
- The PSR also recommended a 2-level enhancement for making a death threat under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F); Wilson did not object to that enhancement at sentencing.
- Wilson objected to the career-offender designation, arguing § 2113(a) robbery-by-intimidation is not categorically a "crime of violence" because it can be convicted without specific intent to intimidate.
- The District Court overruled the career-offender objection, imposed a 151-month sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, and Wilson appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether bank robbery by intimidation under § 2113(a) is categorically a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) | Wilson: § 2113(a) can be violated without intent to intimidate; the objective "reasonable teller" test can criminalize negligent conduct, so the statute lacks the required mens rea to be categorically a crime of violence | Government: "intimidation" entails a threatened use of physical force and § 2113(a) requires at least general intent to commit the taking, so the least culpable conduct (robbery by intimidation) satisfies the Guidelines' force/elements clause | The court held § 2113(a) robbery-by-intimidation is categorically a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1) because "intimidation" involves a threatened use of physical force and § 2113(a) requires knowing conduct (general intent) |
| Whether Elonis requires a specific mens rea for § 2113(a) intimidation element | Wilson: Elonis shows a negligence standard cannot suffice; so § 2113(a) must require specific intent to threaten | Government: Carter and precedent supply a general-intent reading that avoids Elonis concerns; conviction requires knowing action to take property by intimidation | The court held Elonis does not control; Carter requires general intent (knowing taking), which prevents criminalizing innocent conduct, so § 2113(a) satisfies mens rea requirements |
| Whether the District Court plainly erred in applying a threat-of-death (2-level) enhancement | Wilson: enhancement was improper (raised on appeal) | Government: enhancement was applied; but even if erroneous, it did not change the sentence because career-offender range governed | The court held no plain error because the career-offender enhancement produced the applicable Guidelines range; the threat enhancement did not affect the sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Chapman, 866 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2017) (categorical-approach framework and definition of "use" of physical force under § 4B1.2)
- Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000) (reading a general-intent requirement into § 2113 to avoid criminalizing innocent conduct)
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (criminal statutes lacking mens rea risk importing negligence; courts should read scienter where needed to avoid penalizing innocent conduct)
- United States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 1998) ("intimidation" means to make fearful; reasonably perceived threat from victim's perspective)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach: compare statutory elements to the generic offense; least culpable conduct controls)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (context for categorical approach and definition of violent force)