United States v. Jeremy Glispie, 943 F.3d 358

Jeremy Glispie pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) but reserved the right to challenge an ACCA enhancement based on prior Illinois residential burglary convictions.
The district court, following Seventh Circuit precedent, treated Illinois residential burglary as equivalent to “generic burglary” and sentenced Glispie as an armed career criminal to 180 months.
Glispie appealed, arguing Illinois courts apply the limited-authority doctrine (from People v. Weaver) to residential burglary so that the statute’s “without authority” element is effectively collapsed into the intent element, making the statute broader than generic burglary and therefore not an ACCA predicate.
The Seventh Circuit reviewed ACCA categorical-approach principles (Taylor, Descamps, Mathis, Stitt, Quarles) and Illinois case law (Weaver, Bradford, Bush, appellate decisions) bearing on whether Illinois treats “without authority” as a separate element.
The court concluded the Supreme Court of Illinois has not squarely decided whether the limited-authority doctrine applies to the residential-burglary statute, that Dawkins lacked a rigorous elemental analysis, and that the question is both unsettled and outcome-determinative.
The Seventh Circuit therefore certified the controlling question to the Supreme Court of Illinois: whether, and if so under what circumstances, the limited-authority doctrine applies to 720 ILCS 5/19-3 (Illinois residential burglary).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Illinois residential burglary is broader than generic burglary under the ACCA because the limited-authority doctrine collapses “without authority” into intent	Glispie: Illinois courts (Weaver and many appellate decisions) allow proof of intent to imply lack of authority, making the statute broader than the ACCA’s unlawful-entry requirement	Government: Dawkins and other precedent hold Illinois residential burglary aligns with generic burglary; state high-court treatment is not plainly contrary	Court: Issue unsettled; certified to Illinois Supreme Court because its answer is outcome-determinative and state precedent is not controlling or clear
Whether Dawkins controls or should be revisited here	Glispie: Dawkins failed the required categorical/elemental analysis and should be reexamined	Government: Dawkins is controlling precedent and should govern	Court: Found Dawkins’ analysis insufficient for this elemental question and declined to resolve it itself; instead certified the question to the Illinois Supreme Court

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishes federal "generic burglary" definition for ACCA: unlawful/unprivileged entry or remaining in a structure with intent to commit a crime)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits courts to the categorical approach; modified categorical approach applies only to divisible statutes)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (clarifies elements-versus-means analysis and reliance on state-court interpretations)
Stitt v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018) (holds burglary of structures adapted for overnight accommodation qualifies as generic burglary)
Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019) (holds remaining-in burglary covers intent formed at any time while unlawfully present)
Dawkins v. United States, 809 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2016) (Seventh Circuit earlier held Illinois burglary not broader than generic burglary; panel opinion now criticized for insufficient elemental analysis)
People v. Weaver, 243 N.E.2d 245 (Ill. 1968) (articulates limited-authority doctrine: entry with intent to steal exceeds the authority of patrons of a public business)
People v. Bradford, 50 N.E.3d 1112 (Ill. 2016) (refuses to extend limited-authority doctrine to ordinary shoplifting for remaining-in burglary; defines scope of remaining-in)
People v. Bush, 623 N.E.2d 1361 (Ill. 1993) (applies limited-authority reasoning to home-invasion statute and aligns "without authority" interpretations across statutes)