United States v. Jeremy Cary
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 153
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Jeremy S. Cary pleaded guilty under SORNA for failing to register as a sex offender after moving interstate; sentenced to 33 months and a term of supervised release that was later modified after multiple post-conviction and revocation proceedings.
- Cary has a prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse (sexual intercourse with a minor), a recorded history of substance abuse, and subsequent conduct (peering into sorority windows) that prompted revocation proceedings.
- At resentencing and revocation proceedings, the district court imposed several special conditions of supervised release including: a complete ban on alcohol, a ban on “mood-altering substances,” required sex-offender treatment, computer/internet monitoring and filtering, mandatory mental-health treatment and medication, and obligation to pay the costs of some services.
- Cary appealed only the special conditions of supervised release (he did not appeal his original sentence); the appellate standard applied was plain error because Cary had either been on notice or did not object.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed some conditions (alcohol ban, sex-offender treatment, mental-health treatment), vacated or remanded others for clarification (mood-altering substances phrase removed; computer/internet monitoring/filtering and payment-language remanded for clarification and factual findings regarding scope and ability to pay).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cary) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alcohol ban in special condition No.1 | Ban improper because not orally pronounced and appears only in written judgment | Record shows significant alcohol abuse; government defends restriction | Affirmed (Cary withdrew challenge at oral argument) |
| Ban on “mood-altering substances” in No.1 | Phrase is vague and overbroad; not orally pronounced | Government concedes ambiguity and that phrase was not orally pronounced | Vacated as to that phrase; remanded to remove it |
| Mandatory sex-offender treatment (No.3) | SORNA conviction is not a "sex offense," so treatment is not authorized | Sex-offender treatment can be imposed if sexual offenses are recent and related to §3553(a) factors; Cary’s sexual history and recent conduct support treatment | Affirmed (fits Evans rationale) |
| Computer/internet monitoring and filtering (No.6) | Condition vague/overbroad; lacks evidentiary basis; stricter than prior condition | Government concedes software/filter provision needs clarification | Vacated in part and remanded for a hearing to define scope and sites to be blocked |
| Mental-health treatment and medication (No.9) | Insufficient record to compel treatment/medication | Cary requested treatment and court inquired into his mental-health history; record supports condition | Affirmed (Cary effectively waived challenge by requesting treatment) |
| Payment of treatment/filtering costs (Conditions 1,6,9) | Court cannot force payment without findings; may be unable to pay | Statutes and precedents authorize payment condition if offender is able to pay | Affirmed in principle but remanded: district court must add/find "if financially able" (or equivalent) before imposing payment obligations |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515 (7th Cir.) (sex-offender/SORNA and supervised-release issues; cautions about vague "mood-altering" language)
- United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705 (7th Cir.) (requirements for imposing computer filtering and need for sentencing-court factual findings)
- United States v. Evans, 727 F.3d 730 (7th Cir.) (permitting sex-offender treatment even when underlying conviction is not a sex offense if recent sexual history justifies it)
- United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511 (7th Cir.) (procedural issues about notice and review standards for supervised-release conditions)
- United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839 (7th Cir.) (upholding complete alcohol ban where record supports it)
- United States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 443 (7th Cir.) (requirement that sentencing courts explain discretionary supervised-release conditions)
- United States v. Hinds, 770 F.3d 658 (7th Cir.) (permitting payment conditions for treatment if court considers ability to pay)
- United States v. Angle, 598 F.3d 352 (7th Cir.) (upholding internet-use restrictions tied to offense conduct)
- McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir.) (judicial admissions at oral argument are binding)
- United States v. Daddato, 996 F.2d 903 (7th Cir.) (broad discretionary power to impose payment conditions as part of release)