Karl Schave, a member of New Order, a white supremacy organization, sold a number of explosives to an undercover agent posing as a fellow member of the group. These explosives were to be used in a series of violent acts intended to further the white supremacist aims of the New Order. After arrest and indictment, Schave pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of an unregistered destructive device in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871. The district judge sentenced Schave to forty-six months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release.
In addition to the standard conditions of supervised release, the district court im *841 posed four special conditions, two of which are challenged on appeal. The first condition restricts Schave’s use of alcohol and “other legally obtained intoxicants” during the period of supervised release. The second condition prevents Schave, during the period of supervised release, from associating with organizations that, or their members who, espouse violence or the supremacy of the white race. Schave challenges the first as unsupported by sufficient evidence of alcoholism. He challenges the second as impermissibly vague and as an unconstitutional restriction on his associational rights. We affirm.
I.
Schave argues that the alcohol restriction placed upon him by the district court was unsupported by sufficient evidence of prior alcohol abuse. In imposing a term of supervised release, the district court may include, in addition to the mandatory conditions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a), additional conditions of supervised release under § 3563(b). Here, the district court’s order went beyond the standard condition set forth in § 3563(b)(7) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(7), which requires that a defendant refrain from excessive use of alcohol, to prohibit all use of alcohol as well as other legally-obtained intoxicants. Additional conditions which the district court deems necessary are permissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(22) and § 3583(d) even if not specifically set forth in the list of additional conditions in U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d) and (e). The district court may impose a specific condition of supervision so long as the condition:
(1) is reasonably related to specified sentencing factors, namely the nature, and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) is reasonably related to the need to afford adequate deterrence, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve these goals; and
(4) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3563(d), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b).
On appeal, we defer to the district court’s decision to impose a special condition of supervised release and review the condition under the abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Brown,
The district court imposed the alcohol restriction based on evidence compiled in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). According to the defendant’s statements, he began using alcohol at age 16 and marijuana at age 18. After an arrest for driving under the influence in 1990, he was referred to intensive outpatient counseling for substance abuse. At the time, he was diagnosed with mild alcohol dependence and cannabis abuse. Based on the foregoing, the district court concluded that a total restriction on alcohol use would aid the defendant in steering clear of criminal activity during the time of supervised release.
Schave argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the alcohol restriction. In making this argument, he relies principally on two Eighth Circuit cases in which that court vacated conditions of supervised release requiring a defendant to abstain from all lawful alcohol use. In
United States v. Prendergast,
The Eighth Circuit followed the reasoning of
Prendergast
in
United States v. Bass,
We find that
Prendergast
and
Bass
are sufficiently distinguishable from the facts of this case. Similar to the situations in both
Prendergast
and
Bass,
Schave’s offense was unrelated to his alcohol abuse. Unlike those cases, however, the district court here had specific evidence of Schave’s prior alcohol abuse, including a prior diagnosis of alcoholism, upon which to rely in imposing the alcohol restriction. We believe that this brings Schave’s case closer to those in which courts have upheld total restrictions on alcohol use as a condition of supervised release.
See United States v. Wesley,
II.
We turn next to Schave’s challenge to the restriction on his association with violent or white supremacist organizations during the period of his supervised release. Schave concedes that his providing explosives to further the aims of white supremacy provides sufficient evidence upon which to impose such a condition. His challenge is that the actual condition imposed is void for vagueness and an unconstitutional infringement on his right to associate.
Cf. United States v. Showalter,
A condition of supervised release is unconstitutionally vague if it would not afford a person of reasonable intelligence with sufficient notice as to the conduct prohibited.
Birzon v. King,
The association restriction challenged by Schave in this case provides that he “shall not associate, either directly or indirectly, with any member or organization which espouses violence or the supremacy of the white race.” The condition as written is inartfully drafted. The provision prohibiting association with “any member” fails to refer to organizations espousing violence or supremacy as it was presumably intended to do. Without much difficulty, however, we can construe the provision to prohibit association with organizations that, or their members who, espouse violence or the supremacy of the white race.
A second, and more nettlesome, problem is the absence of an explicit scienter requirement in the restriction. If read literally, Schave could be found guilty of violating the terms of his supervised release simply by working alongside or befriending someone who, unbeknownst to him, espoused violence or the supremacy of the white race. Another difficulty lies with the condition’s prohibition on association with “organization^] espousing violence or the supremacy of the white race” (emphasis added). The disjunctive raises the possibility that Schave might be found to violate the terms of his supervised release should he participate, for example, in a group or political party that supported an ongoing United States military action. Thus viewed, the restriction is potentially overbroad and vague, first, because it may cover some protected activity and, second, because it may leave Schave to speculate as to which of the possible violations within the scope of the restriction would be charged and prosecuted.
However, these potential constitutional difficulties are easily avoided through an appropriate limiting construction. The district court’s power to impose *844 special conditions of supervised release is circumscribed by the requirement that the restrictions reasonably relate to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence imposed. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3563(d), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b). We do not believe that the district court, surely aware of the limitations on its own power, intended the restriction to cover the broad range of possible activities suggested by our previous examples. Rather, we interpret the restriction in light of the crime for which Schave was charged and which necessitated the imposition of conditions of supervised release. Schave provided weapons and explosives to a fellow member of the New Order for the purpose of facilitating attacks against a number of civil rights organizations, including the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Anti-Defamation League. We understand the district court’s associational restriction to reach only those activities which would reasonably relate to the danger of his reassociat-ing with white supremacist groups or organizations which pursue their aims through violent means. So understood, the condition provides sufficient notice of the conduct prohibited and hence is not unconstitutionally vague.
Our construction of the scope of the restriction addresses whatever constitutional concerns its literal language may present as a limitation on Schave’s associational rights. The constitutional rights of a convict on supervised release or parole are not unfettered.
See, e.g., Ritter,
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AffiRM the alcohol and associational restrictions imposed by the district court as a condition' of the defendant’s supervised release.