697 F.Supp.3d 380
E.D. Pa.2023Background
- Jenkins was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after Philadelphia officers found a loaded Rock Island .38 revolver in his jacket pocket on Nov. 23, 2022; officers also found suspected methamphetamine.
- Jenkins has a prior Pennsylvania conviction punishable by more than one year, which triggers the federal felon-in-possession prohibition.
- He moved to dismiss the indictment on multiple grounds: that § 922(g)(1) is facially and as-applied unconstitutional under the Second Amendment (relying on Bruen and Range), void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment, and beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
- The decision analyzes post-Bruen Second Amendment methodology, explains Range (3d Cir. en banc) and how to apply its three-step as-applied framework (who are “the people,” whether the specific conduct is Second Amendment conduct, and historical-analogue review).
- The court ruled Jenkins bears the preponderance burden to show his conduct was Second Amendment–protected, found Jenkins introduced no evidence he carried the gun for self-defense (or other protected uses), held § 922(g)(1) is not unconstitutionally vague at the time of his arrest, and denied the motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facial Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) | Jenkins: statute lacks founding-era analogue and is therefore always unconstitutional | Gov: Range is narrow; longstanding prohibitions (e.g., dangerous felons) survive; statute can be constitutional in many applications | Denied—facial challenge fails; statute remains constitutional in at least some applications (e.g., dangerous persons) |
| As-applied Second Amendment challenge | Jenkins: § 922(g)(1) bars him from bearing any arms and thus applies to protected conduct without further proof | Gov: Court must assess the specific conduct and purpose when arrested; if not protected conduct, § 922(g)(1) applies | Denied—Jenkins failed to prove by preponderance that his possession was Second Amendment–protected (no evidence he carried for self-defense or another protected purpose) |
| Vagueness (Due Process) | Jenkins: statute is vague as to who is disarmed and for how long | Gov: § 922(g)(1) plainly defines the prohibited conduct at the time of arrest | Denied—statute provided fair notice at the time Jenkins acted; not unconstitutionally vague |
| Burden and evidentiary rules for as-applied challenges post-Bruen/Range | Jenkins: challenges blur facial vs. as-applied; defendant need not prove protected purpose | Gov: defendant bears burden to show (by preponderance) he is among “the people” and engaged in protected conduct; government then must identify historical analogues | Court adopts gov’t formulation for burden: defendant must prove he and his conduct are covered; objective and subjective evidence may be considered; Jenkins did not meet the burden |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (recognizes individual right to possess firearms for lawful self-defense in the home)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (incorporates Second Amendment against the states)
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (establishes historical-analogy test for Second Amendment challenges)
- Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. en banc) (applies Bruen to § 922(g)(1) and holds statute unconstitutional as applied to that plaintiff)
- Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir.) (earlier Third Circuit framework and discussion of presumptively lawful prohibitions)
- Marzzarella v. United States, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir.) (discusses the scope of Second Amendment conduct and prior two-step analyses)
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (addresses mens rea requirements in federal firearms offenses)