United States v. Jeffrey Olsen
995 F.3d 683
| 9th Cir. | 2021Background
- Jeffrey Olsen, a California physician, was indicted in July 2017 on 34 counts alleging unlawful opioid prescriptions; he has been on pretrial release since arraignment.
- Olsen’s trial date was continued eight times over three years (some by stipulation; one over the government’s objection), most recently to October 13, 2020.
- In March 2020 the Central District of California suspended criminal jury trials due to COVID-19 under courtwide emergency orders.
- The government moved for an "ends of justice" continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A); the district court denied the motion, concluding continuances under that provision require literal impossibility of holding trial.
- The district court then dismissed Olsen’s indictment with prejudice as a remedy; the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the district court misread the Speedy Trial Act and abused its discretion in imposing dismissal with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper interpretation of Speedy Trial Act §3161(h)(7)(A)/(B)(i): whether "ends of justice" continuances require literal impossibility to hold trial | The government argued a continuance was warranted given the courtwide suspension and public-health constraints; courts may exclude time where failure to grant a continuance would make continuation impossible or cause a miscarriage of justice | Olsen argued ends-of-justice applies only when holding the trial is literally impossible | Reversed district court: literal impossibility is not required; the statute asks whether failure to grant a continuance would make continuation impossible or cause a miscarriage of justice, and courts must consider the provision as a whole. |
| Whether district court abused discretion by dismissing indictment with prejudice | Government argued dismissal with prejudice was unnecessary and the court failed to apply required factors under 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)(2) | Olsen argued dismissal with prejudice was necessary to deter further institutional delay | Reversed: district court abused discretion by focusing on courtwide policy rather than case-specific factors and misapplying the law on remedies; dismissal with prejudice was improper. |
| Whether district court considered required and relevant non-statutory factors during pandemic | Government emphasized need to weigh prosecutorial culpability, defendants' pretrial status, length of delay, public-health orders, and court ability to proceed safely | Olsen stressed that because a trial was physically possible the court must proceed | Ninth Circuit remanded and listed relevant non-exhaustive pandemic considerations (e.g., detention status, length of delay, defendant invocation of rights, seriousness of charges, court's ability to conduct trial safely) and faulted district court for failing to address them. |
Key Cases Cited
- Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (Speedy Trial Act contains specified exclusions and an ends-of-justice provision)
- Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (ends-of-justice exclusion supports necessary trial scheduling flexibility)
- Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.) (natural disaster delays justified ends-of-justice continuance)
- Paschall v. United States, 988 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.) (weather-related impediments justified short ends-of-justice exclusion)
- Clymer v. United States, 25 F.3d 824 (9th Cir.) (ends-of-justice exclusion intended to be used rarely)
- Taylor v. United States, 487 U.S. 326 (standards for dismissal with or without prejudice under Speedy Trial Act)
- Murillo v. United States, 288 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.) (review standard for ends-of-justice determinations)
- In re Approval of Judicial Emergency Declared in the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 955 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.) (judicial council approval of district emergency and its Speedy Trial Act implications)