778 F.3d 536
6th Cir.2015Background
- Montgomery County task force investigated Dion Ross for drug trafficking and money laundering; Brown-Jennings suspected as Ross’s front.
- Litchfield Avenue property title held by Brown-Jennings, utilities in her name, house appeared unoccupied for months.
- Ross visited Litchfield residence, delivered cocaine to a confidential informant from there.
- Burney began listing Litchfield as his residence while on parole for crack possession and had a truck registered there.
- After an 8+ month investigation, magistrate issued a 17-page warrant affidavit linking the property to Ross’s operation; warrant issued.
- Police searched Litchfield property; Burney found, firearms and crack cocaine recovered; Burney indicted for felon in possession and distribution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Probable cause to search the Litchfield property | Burney; lacks link to Ross; residence change defeats nexus | Burney was not the focus; property tied to Ross’s stash house; probable cause exists | Probable cause established; warrant valid |
| Staleness of information linking the property to drug activity | Information relied on dates long past; stale evidence | Prolonged operation and ongoing stash-house use keep evidence non-stale | Evidence not stale; four-factor test supports timeliness |
| Effect of Burney’s later residence on probable cause | Burney’s occupancy signals change in control; undermines warrant | Ross’s operation continued to connect property to evidence; occupancy did not erase nexus | Probable cause remains; Burney’s residency did not defeat nexus |
| Good-faith exception applicability | Not necessary; probable cause lacking if warrant invalid | Leon good-faith may apply if warrant facially valid | Not necessary to decide; warrant upheld for probable cause |
Key Cases Cited
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause requires fair probability, practical considerations)
- Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (focus on justification for entry to seize evidence at location)
- United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (staleness factors in probable cause analysis)
- United States v. Brooks, 594 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2010) (freshness of narcotics evidence; distinctions when seeking stash-house evidence)
- Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014) (probable cause standard is a fair probability standard, not high bar)
- United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2004) (nexus between place searched and evidence sought; en banc discussion)
- Hython, 443 F.3d 480 (6th Cir. 2006) (need for current information after change of possession for warrants)
- United States v. Jackson, 470 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2006) (magistrate deference in probable cause assessment)
- United States v. Williams, 480 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1973) (timeliness considerations in staleness analysis)
- United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2001) (deference to magistrate’s probable cause assessment)
