United States v. Javier Hart
983 F.3d 638
| 3rd Cir. | 2020Background
- In 2005, Javier Hart was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine; his Guidelines range recommended 35 years to life, but a statutory mandatory life sentence applied at the time.
- The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act raised crack thresholds and lowered mandatory minimums; the 2018 First Step Act made those Fair Sentencing Act reductions retroactive and authorized eligible prisoners to move for reduced sentences under §404(b).
- A local U.S. Attorney–Federal Defender screening committee negotiated quick, floor-range §404(b) reductions for many prisoners, including Hart, who accepted a negotiated reduction from life to 35 years in March 2019.
- Later case law clarified that courts may consider the full set of 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) factors (including post‑sentencing rehabilitation) at a First Step Act resentencing; Hart moved for a further reduction under §3553(a), which the district court denied without considering those factors.
- The district court also suggested §404(c) bars any second §404(b) resentencing because Hart’s sentence had already been reduced “in accordance with” the Fair Sentencing Act; the government concedes the procedural error and asks this Court to accept a waiver of §404(c) and remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §404(c) applies to bar Hart’s second §404(b) resentencing | Hart: Reduction was under the 2018 First Step Act, so §404(c) does not bar a new motion | Gov: Reduction depended on the Fair Sentencing Act’s lowered minimums and the First Step Act’s retroactivity, so §404(c) applies | §404(c) covers Hart—both statutes were necessary for the earlier reduction |
| Whether §404(c) is jurisdictional (i.e., nonwaivable) | Hart: (implicit) if jurisdictional, bars relief | Gov: §404(c) is not jurisdictional and may be waived | §404(c) is not jurisdictional; presumption against jurisdictional treatment of remedial bars applies |
| Whether the Government can waive §404(c) to permit a new resentencing | Hart: seeks the opportunity for full §3553(a) consideration | Gov: waives §404(c) in interests of justice | Court accepts the Government’s waiver and remands so district court may resentence consistent with precedent (Easter) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2020) (courts must consider all applicable §3553(a) factors on First Step Act resentencing)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (Congress must clearly state when a rule is jurisdictional)
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (post‑sentencing rehabilitation is a §3553(a) consideration)
- Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (traditional understanding of jurisdiction as power to hear cases at all)
- Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (Congress can make limits jurisdictional but must do so clearly)
- Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (jurisdictional rules typically lack equitable exceptions like waiver)
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (interpreting the Fair Sentencing Act’s reach)
- United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789 (11th Cir. 2009) (resentencing after guideline change is a continuation of the criminal case, not a separate post‑conviction action)