United States v. Jason Lee
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8402
9th Cir.2016Background
- Jason Lee was convicted of distributing crack cocaine; after sentencing the district court applied the Guidelines §4B1.1 career‑offender enhancement based on prior California convictions and calculated a Guidelines range accordingly.
- On initial appeal this Court (Lee I) held only one prior drug conviction qualified as a predicate controlled‑substance offense and remanded to determine whether Lee’s convictions under Cal. Penal Code §§243.1 (battery on custodial officer) and 69 (resisting/deterring an officer) were "crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a).
- On remand the district court found both prior convictions were crimes of violence, reapplied the career‑offender enhancement, and recalculated a higher Guidelines range; Lee was resentenced and appealed.
- The panel analyzed whether §§243.1 and 69 qualify under the §4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause ("otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury") using the categorical/modified categorical approaches and pre‑Johnson §4B1.2 jurisprudence.
- The majority concluded neither conviction categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause and vacated Lee’s sentence, remanding for resentencing without the career‑offender enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lee) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lee has "at least two" predicate convictions to be a career offender under U.S.S.G. §4B1.1(a) | Only one prior drug conviction qualifies; the §243.1 and §69 convictions are not crimes of violence so Lee is not a career offender | §243.1 and §69 each qualify under the residual clause as crimes of violence, enabling career‑offender status | Held: Lee does not have two qualifying predicates; career‑offender enhancement was improper; sentence vacated and remanded |
| Whether Cal. Penal Code §243.1 (battery on custodial officer) is a categorical "crime of violence" under §4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause | §243.1 cannot be satisfied by mere minimal touching and is aimed at custodial officer assaults, so it presents serious potential risk | The custodial‑officer context raises a heightened risk ("powder keg"), making it qualify | Held: §243.1 does not categorically present a serious potential risk of physical injury (can be committed by slight touching); not a crime of violence |
| Whether Cal. Penal Code §69 (attempting to deter or resisting an officer) is a categorical "crime of violence" under §4B1.2(a)(2) | Lee’s conviction may rest on the "actually resisting" prong which can involve de minimis force and thus does not present substantial/serious risk | §69 involves threats or force against officers and can present serious risk; at minimum the statute is divisible and could qualify | Held: Applying the modified categorical approach, the record does not establish a qualifying prong; the "actually resisting" prong does not categorically present a serious potential risk and thus §69 does not qualify for career‑offender enhancement |
| Whether the Guidelines residual clause itself is void for vagueness post‑Johnson and whether the court must address that constitutional issue | Lee argued residual clause questions (and several circuits held the Guidelines clause void post‑Johnson) | Government urged that, even if ACCA’s clause is void, the Guidelines clause should be treated differently; the court could avoid the constitutional question | Held: The majority avoided the constitutional question because it resolved the appeal under pre‑Johnson categorical analysis (found neither offense categorically violent); did not decide whether §4B1.2(a)(2) is void for vagueness |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lee, 704 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2012) (earlier appeal holding one prior drug conviction qualified as controlled‑substance predicate)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held unconstitutionally vague)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical and modified categorical approaches clarified)
- United States v. Spencer, 724 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing use of ACCA jurisprudence to interpret Guidelines residual clause)
- United States v. Flores‑Lopez, 685 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding §69’s resisting prong may be satisfied by de minimis force for §16(b) purposes)
- United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2013) (battery on officer statute that may be satisfied by slight touching does not qualify under residual clause)
- Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (procedural error in Guidelines calculation requires remand to resentencing)