United States v. Jarreous Blewitt
719 F.3d 482
6th Cir.2013Background
- Blewetts, two incarcerated defendants, challenged old 100-to-1 crack-to-powder sentencing under 2005 mandatory minimums.
- They seek retroactive resentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and § 994(u) due to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.
- FA Act lowered the ratio to 18-to-1 and adjusted related mandatory minimums; retroactivity was not explicit in the Act.
- District court sentenced the Blewetts in 2005 under the pre-Act regime based on crack quantity.
- Government contends many pre-Act crack defendants remain in prison; Blewetts argue retroactive application is constitutionally required.
- Court addresses whether the new law should be applied retroactively to reduce old mandatory minimums.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Fair Sentencing Act applies retroactively to pre-Act sentences | Blewett contends retroactivity via § 3582(c)(2) and the new guidelines should apply. | Government argues no retroactive effect for old mandatory minimums; Dorsey limits retroactivity. | Retroactive application required by equal protection and guidelines interpretation. |
| Whether equal protection requires retroactive relief for discriminatory old statutes | Blewett asserts ongoing discrimination from old 100:1 ratio—remedial Act must retroactively fix it. | Government disputes intentional discrimination post-FSA; existing precedents uphold the old ratio. | Old discriminatory minimums must be replaced retroactively to cure equal protection concerns. |
| Whether § 1B1.10 policy statements permit retroactive reduction for amended minimums tied to new Act | Blewett argues amended guidelines and minimums should trigger § 3582(c)(2) relief. | Government argues the pre-Act mandatory minimums were not “lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” | Guidelines must be interpreted to incorporate the new minimums; retroactivity applies to the amended framework. |
| Whether Dorsey v. United States governs retroactivity in § 3582(c)(2) context | Blewett leans on Dorsey to support full retroactivity. | Hammond controls in the circuit; Dorsey does not mandate retroactivity in § 3582(c)(2). | Hammond controls; Act does not fully retroactively apply under § 3582(c)(2) to these defendants. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) (Supreme Court: new law adopted to remedy racial disparity; retroactivity analyzed via Dorsey framework)
- McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (statistical disparity alone insufficient to show intentional discrimination)
- Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (racial discrimination requires substantial justification; discriminatory purpose implied)
- Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial perpetuation of discrimination cannot be tolerated)
- Williams, 962 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1992) (one-to-one hundred crack-to-powder ratio does not violate equal protection)
- Reece, 994 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1993) (disparate impact alone insufficient for invidious discrimination)
- Hammond, 712 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2013) (limits retroactive application of Fair Sentencing Act under § 3582(c)(2))
- Dixon (3d Cir.), 648 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (retroactivity logic in guideline amendments)
- Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (statutory duties to avoid racial discrimination in judicial action)